

Between foreseen and unforeseen - policing in a complex reality

The approach to the riots in Amsterdam on November 7 and 8, 2024: preparation and action in pictures

The approach to the unrest in Amsterdam on November 7 and 8, 2024

Table of contents

Foreword	3
Summary	
	4 Findings
.....	5
	Regarding the police
.....	5 Regarding
NCTV	6 Main
analysis	7

	Conclusions
.....	9
	Recommendations
.....	101.
Introduction	
	. 111.1 Background
.....	11 1.2 Objective
.....	11 1.3
Central question	12
	1.4 Scope
.....	12 Period
.....	12
	Processes
.....	12 1.5
Research approach	13
Documents	13
	Interviews
.....	13
Framework of standards	13
Reporting	14 1.6
Explanation of terminology used in this report	15 1.7
Reader's guide	162.
Chronological overview of the main events	172.1
Preparations	17 August 30,
2024: 'the draw for the Europa League Ajax - Maccabi Tel Aviv'	17 October 9, 2024:
'start of operational preparation'	18 October 14,
2024: 'triangle consultation with Ajax'	19 October
22, 2024: 'sub-triangle consultation on risks and scenarios'	19
October 24, 2024: 'concretization of information and risk assessment'	
.....	20 October 29, 2024: 'contact with the mayor and NCTV about the
Kristallnacht commemoration'	21 October 30, 2024: 'information request by NCTV'
.....	22 October 30, 2024: 'triangle decides on a single
SGBO'	22 October 31, 2024: 'elaboration of
coordination and further identification of risks'	22 November 1, 2024:
'scenarios are discussed in sub-triangle'	23 November 3, 2024:
'notification of demonstration at the Arena'	24 November 4, 2024:
'sharing images and possible courses of action'	24

.....	25
November 5, 2024: 'focusing images and practical implementation'	26
November 5, 2024: 'operational letter from the NCTV'	
.....27 2.2. One day before the match	
.....27 November 6, 2024: 'morning	
and afternoon before the match'	27
November 6, 2024: 'early	
evening'	28
November 7, 2024:	
'early morning'	30
2.3. Match Day	
and Commemoration of Kristallnacht.....	32
November 7, 2024:	
'Morning and Afternoon'.....	32
November 7, 2024: 'Late	
Afternoon and Evening'.....	34
November 7, 2024: 'Late	
Evening and Night'.....	39
November 8, 2024: 'Early	
Morning'.....	41
3. Analysis of the events	
and approach	46
4. Conclusion and	
recommendations	46
48 Recommendations.....	
49
5. Final observations: between foreseen and unforeseen – judging the police in a	
complex reality	50
Appendix	1:
	Abbreviations
.....	51
Appendix 2:	
Overview of main documents used	52
Appendix 3: Large-Scale and Special Operations Staff (SGB0)	53
Appendix 4: Flash attacks: online-induced public disturbances in a digital context	54

Foreword

This report from the Inspectorate of Justice and Security (hereinafter: Inspectorate JenV) addresses the actions of the police and the National Coordinator for Counterterrorism and Security (NCTV) before and during the unrest in Amsterdam on 7 and 8 November 2024. These incidents represented a significant challenge for maintaining public order and safety in the city.

The escalation of violence – including targeted attacks on people of Jewish background or perceived as such, confrontations between groups, and the rapidly changing nature of events – highlights the complexity of policing under difficult circumstances.

The title, *'between foreseen and unforeseen – policing in a complex reality'*, reflects both the preparation for expected scenarios and the confrontation with unexpected developments. The police had thoroughly prepared for the risks surrounding the Ajax-Maccabi Tel Aviv match and the commemoration of Kristallnacht. Yet, the situation unfolded differently than anticipated. The rapid spread of calls for violence via social media, the difficult-to-track movements of rioters, and the sudden escalation of violence led to situations not included in the pre-planned scenarios.

The context in which these disturbances occurred was complex. Tensions, resulting from the war in Gaza and Lebanon, contributed to a high level of emotion—both among citizens affected by the situation in the Middle East and within the public and political debate. While this context is not ignored, the Inspectorate of Justice and Security focuses primarily on assessing the facts. This report reveals where police action was effective and where there is room for improvement. Attention is paid to anticipating escalations fueled by social media, the role of the NCTV (National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism) in identifying threats, and the provision of information and cooperation within the police organization during these events.

The police acted with great dedication, flexibility, and professionalism during the incident. The Inspectorate of Justice and Security (JenV) notes that the police acted decisively, but also that they were sometimes overtaken by the speed and unpredictability of developments. This underscores the need for a strong information position and the ability to respond quickly in complex and rapidly escalating situations.

The NCTV acted in accordance with its duties in identifying potential threats surrounding the Kristallnacht commemoration. As usual, it requested information from the intelligence and security services and concluded that there was no concrete (terrorist) threat. At the same time, this case demonstrates that the NCTV must communicate (even) more clearly what its role encompasses and which aspects of the threat assessment it can be questioned about. This applies to both local government and other involved partners.

Finally, I would like to express my appreciation for the open and constructive attitude of the many employees at all levels within the police and NCTV who contributed to this investigation.

*The Acting Inspector General of the Justice and Security Inspectorate,
on behalf of this,*

*P.C.J. Neuteboom
Chief Inspector-Director of Police, Security and Crisis Management*

3

The approach to the unrest in Amsterdam on November 7 and 8, 2024

Summary

In this report, the Inspectorate for Justice and Security (hereinafter: the Inspectorate for Justice and Security) investigated how the police and the NCTV acted in the lead-up to and during the unrest on November 7 and 8, 2024, in Amsterdam. The investigation was prompted by the serious violent incidents surrounding the Ajax-Maccabi Tel Aviv football match. Violent confrontations occurred in several locations throughout the city, with groups deliberately seeking each other out, making de-escalation virtually impossible. During the night of November 7-8, the violence reached a peak: people with a Jewish background, or perceived as such, were targeted in public spaces with targeted threats, intimidation, and assault.

The Inspectorate of Justice and Security has assessed the actions of the police and the NCTV based on four supervisory aspects: governance, cooperation, information provision and equipment.¹The analysis shows that the police had to operate in a context where the risk of public disorder, social tensions, and the rapid dissemination of calls and images via social media converged. Under such circumstances, effective action proved complex.

The NCTV acted within its responsibilities and in accordance with its role in identifying potential threats. In accordance with its standard procedures, information was requested from the relevant services, after which it was determined that no concrete threat existed.

The following research question is central to the study:

How did the police and the NCTV act before and during the unrest in Amsterdam on November 7 and 8, 2024, and to what extent did their performance of tasks—in the areas of governance,

cooperation, information provision, and equipment—contribute to controlling and limiting the public disturbances and ensuring public safety?

To answer this research question, documents were analyzed and interviews were conducted. The interviews were conducted with staff from the police, the National Coordinator for Counterterrorism and Security (NCTV), and the Municipality of Amsterdam. Police liaison officers from the Israeli embassy were also interviewed.

¹For a further explanation of these four supervisory aspects, see Chapter 1, paragraph 5 'Research approach – framework of standards'.

Findings

Regarding the police

The police operate within the framework of local government. Administrative decision-making takes place within the triangular structure² and is operationalized in the SGBO³Attention is paid to risk scenarios and measures aimed at them, such as identifying risk areas, preparing for a demonstration and coordinating the fan walk.⁴The governance is well-organized in both design and execution; there is a clear plan, and the division of roles and tasks within the police force and between the police and the municipality was clear. At the same time, experience shows that complete predictability is impossible during complex, converging events. The escalation during the night of November 7th to 8th demonstrates that situations can arise that fall outside the predefined scenarios. Within the existing structures, there is room for adjustment to respond to unexpected situations, and the police flexibly adapt their efforts where necessary. At the same time, it proves difficult to translate administrative agreements into effective action on the streets in real time, especially when groups of rioters deliberately seek confrontation and use blunt force. The limits of what is feasible under such circumstances are thus becoming tangible.

The collaboration between police and partners on (and in the lead-up to) November 7th and 8th was characterized by structured coordination and information exchange. Joint decisions were made regarding the relocation of a demonstration, transport flows, and deployment priorities. Coordination was generally successful, but vulnerabilities emerged under pressure. For example, it proved difficult to get information about rapidly changing situations to the appropriate operational levels in a timely manner. The police had to constantly adapt. Their room for maneuver was limited, partly because rioters deliberately hid from police surveillance. During the night of November 7th and 8th, this led to situations in which police teams operated in scattered locations throughout the city, making it difficult to maintain a complete overview.

Information provision is in order prior to the incident. The police monitor social media and consider various scenarios. During escalations, they gather real-time information, including through Open

Source Intelligence (OSINT), police on the street, and the emergency dispatch center. Here too, it becomes clear that advance information does not guarantee predictability. The role of social media proves to have a major influence on the course of events; calls and images spread rapidly, exacerbate existing tensions, and can quickly lead to the formation of groups and confrontations on the street. Relatively minor incidents, such as the removal of a Palestinian flag by Maccabi supporters, are shared, interpreted, and exaggerated within minutes. The impact of such images is difficult for the police to assess in advance. The speed with which groups mobilize and spread calls often means that the police can only act reactively. Even though information coverage is broad, the actual translation of signals into preventive action remains limited, partly because it is difficult to distinguish between incitement and an actual threat.

² The police operate under the jurisdiction of the local authority. Police action is determined in consultation within the so-called "triangle," which includes the mayor and the Public Prosecution Service (OM) in addition to the police.³ In (extraordinary) circumstances where regular powers and/or regular coordination are insufficient to eliminate the threat, a special form of command or coordination may be chosen to carry out the police task. This is called large-scale or special operations. An SGBO is led by a General Officer Commanding. This officer directs the so-called "buttons": specialists who focus on a specific task within the SGBO. Examples include the Head of Information (HIN) and the Head of Law Enforcement (HOHA). For more information, see: National SGBO Regulations 2019.

⁴ A "fan walk" is an organized march of supporters to the stadium, often before a match. This usually involves singing, flags, torches, and other atmospheric elements.

The police are generally adequately equipped. The deployment is extensive, with over 1,200 police officers, including specialized units. The police have resources such as drones, arrest units, reconnaissance units, peacekeeping units, a Mobile Unit, horses, and water cannons. In regular situations, this staffing level provides sufficient scope for action.

The unrest on November 7 and 8, however, shows that traditional means (such as the use of riot police) are not always sufficient.⁵ The presence of small groups of rioters, the use of taxis and scooters for rapid movement, and the targeted search for Jewish individuals on the streets place different demands on the approach. The police must operate in a dynamic and rapidly changing environment. Their established structures and units are less equipped for this. The police's improvisational capacity proves considerable, but it also has its limits.

The Inspectorate of Justice and Security (JenV) notes that the police acted with great dedication, flexibility, and professionalism during the incidents. However, they were unable to fully control the public order disturbance because they were sometimes overtaken by the speed and unpredictability of the events.

With regard to NCTV

The NCTV acted within its responsibilities in accordance with its role in identifying potential threats surrounding the Kristallnacht commemoration. In accordance with its standard procedures, information was requested from the relevant services, after which it was determined that there was no concrete threat.⁶ The NCTV's role within the surveillance and security system has thus been fulfilled as intended.

At the same time, this case demonstrates the lack of clarity within local government and the police about what the NCTV does and does not do. The NCTV has no role in identifying public order problems. The NCTV's task is to respond every time a (terrorist) threat is identified.⁷ It is to identify this threat. Unlike the general threat level of 4, this (terrorist) threat has not been identified in relation to the football match. In practice, it appears that the responsibilities of the NCTV (what

they do and don't look at) for local government and the police in interpreting threats are not always clear.

⁵ See Chapter 1, paragraph 6 for an explanation of the terminology used in this report.⁶ The National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (NCTV) protects the Netherlands against threats that can disrupt society. The NCTV is responsible for coordination in the areas of counterterrorism, cybersecurity, national security, crisis management, and resilience against state threats. <https://www.nctv.nl/documenten/publicaties/2022/03/31/wat-doet-de-nctv>⁷ The same.

6

The approach to the unrest in Amsterdam on November 7 and 8, 2024

Main analysis⁸

Governance

Governance within the police force is fundamentally well-established. Decision-making takes place at the administrative level within the triangular structure, based on risk scenarios and operationalized in the SGBO (Combat Intelligence and Security Service). The police operate within clear authority structures and are prepared for escalation. At the same time, events demonstrate that complete predictability is impossible. The police demonstrate flexibility by adapting their efforts during the course of events and, in many cases, are able to translate administrative decisions quickly and effectively into practice. At the same time, this translation process is sometimes under pressure, especially when developments unfold more rapidly than anticipated.

The NCTV operates within the system of surveillance and security and has applied its threat assessment process in accordance with the procedures for situations of increased risk for persons requiring protection within the national government domain and at the request of the local authority. The request for information about potential threats was promptly escalated to relevant services. Decision-making on additional measures within the framework of public order rests with the local authority; the NCTV does not have a management role in this matter, but rather advises and informs. This division of roles is clearly defined in design, but in this case, it was not equally clear to all partners.

Cooperation

Cooperation between the police and local government is structured and has short lines of communication. Within the triangle, sub-triangle⁹ Continuous coordination takes place within the SGBO. This multidisciplinary approach increases the police's capacity to act. However, rapidly changing situations create friction in information exchange. The speed with which rioters change locations and tactics places high demands on the coordination of intelligence and execution.

Collaboration between the NCTV and other parties such as the municipality, police, and intelligence services proceeded according to regular procedures. The NCTV gathered and shared information through the so-called operational letter.¹⁰ which identifies the risks associated with the Kristallnacht commemoration and the dignitaries involved. During the preparations, careful

consideration was given to potential security issues, and appropriate measures are being taken in collaboration with partners to manage the risks.

Information provision

The police's information position is sound prior to the events. Risks have been identified, and real-time monitoring supports their response. Public sources and social media are important sources of information. Interpreting signals and distinguishing between threats and incitement remains complex, making preventive action often possible, but not always. Thanks to the broad information coverage, the police can often operate proactively.

⁸ See Chapter 3 for the full analysis. ⁹ The sub-triangle, consisting of officials from the Municipality, the Public Prosecution Service and the Police, has an advisory role with regard to the ('large') triangle in which the (deputy) mayor, (deputy) chief public prosecutor and unit chief participate.

¹⁰ An operational brief is a document that shares specific information, instructions, or points of interest relevant to the execution of a specific task or operation. In the context of security organizations like the NCTV, an operational brief can, for example, provide information about a threat assessment or specific risks, identify points of interest relevant to decision-making or execution, call for cooperation or coordination with other parties, and outline specific operational consequences of an event or situation.

The NCTV maintains an information posture that is built through the intelligence and security services, and through signals from relevant ministries and partners. In this case, the NCTV received no signals indicating a specific (terrorist) threat. No additional measures were recommended, but the importance of vigilance was emphasized in the operational letter. This approach aligns with the regular process.

Equipment

The police are present with a large and diverse force. Specialized units and resources are available and deployed effectively. Essentially, the equipment is sufficient for the anticipated risks. However, the nature of the public disturbances—including flash attacks and targeted confrontations—requires more agility than regular structures can provide. The police are adapting, but the improvised nature of their operations reveals the limits of existing capacity and resources.

The NCTV's equipment (people and resources) focuses on analysis, interpretation, and coordination at the national level and, in this case, met the requirements set for it within the surveillance and security system.

Conclusions

Based on the analysis, the Inspectorate of Justice and Security reaches the following final conclusions.

Regarding the police

- 1. The police acted professionally and with great commitment in a demanding situation.**
- 2. The police demonstrated flexibility by responding quickly to the course of events. At the same time, the events make it clear that it is unrealistic to expect the police to maintain complete control over rapidly escalating and unpredictable developments under all circumstances.**
- 3. Events have shown that a strong information position and flexible action are decisive for managing complex situations and effectively tackling public disturbances.**

With regard to the NCTV

- 1. The NCTV acted in accordance with its duties in identifying potential threats surrounding the Kristallnacht commemoration.**
- 2. Clear communication about the tasks and limitations of the NCTV is essential to keep expectations of administrative and operational partners realistic and to prevent misunderstandings.**

Recommendations

Based on its conclusions, the Inspectorate of Justice and Security makes the following recommendations.

Recommendation to the Chief of Police

Continue to invest in refining information collection and its interpretation, and in developing flexible intervention strategies.

Recommendation to the National Coordinator for Counterterrorism and Security

Ensure clear and proactive communication about the NCTV's tasks, responsibilities, and limitations, so that administrative and operational partners have a realistic understanding of its role and options for action on security issues.

1. Introduction

1.1 Reason

Both in the Netherlands and internationally, people reacted with horror to the violence on November 7 and 8, 2024, in Amsterdam surrounding the Ajax-Maccabi Tel Aviv football match. Football fans and Palestinian supporters sought confrontation, which resulted in violence. A number¹¹ People were injured. During the explosion of violence in the early morning of November 8th, rioters targeted people they apparently considered Jewish, regardless of their actual background. This sparked widespread public outrage.

Images of the confrontations, along with antisemitic and racist remarks, including hateful slogans against people of both Jewish and Arab backgrounds, circulated on social media. Police were busy controlling the situation, separating rioters, and preventing any escalation of violence and public disorder as much as possible.

These events have prompted the Justice and Security Inspectorate (hereinafter: JenV Inspectorate) to investigate the actions of the police and the National Coordinator for Counterterrorism and Security (NCTV) prior to and during the incidents.

1.2 Objective

The aim of this investigation is to gain insight into the performance of tasks by the police and the NCTV prior to and during the unrest in Amsterdam on 7 and 8 November 2024. The Inspectorate of Justice and Security is investigating the extent to which the actions of both organizations—in the areas of governance, cooperation, information provision, and equipment—contributed to controlling the public disturbances and ensuring public safety.

The investigation focuses explicitly on increasing learning capacity. By providing insight into the course of events and how both organizations acted, the Inspectorate of Justice and Security aims to make recommendations that contribute to improving task performance. In doing so, it aims to contribute to a more effective approach to similar situations in the future.

¹¹ The exact number of injuries is unknown. In the early morning of November 8th (see timeline), it was known that a total of five people were injured, two of whom were taken away by ambulance, including one with a broken leg. It is likely that the actual number of injuries was higher.

1.3 Central question

The research question in this study is as follows:¹² central:

How did the police and the NCTV act before and during the unrest in Amsterdam on 7 and 8 November 2024 and to what extent did their performance of tasks – in the areas of governance, cooperation, information provision and equipment – contributed to controlling and limiting public disturbances and ensuring public safety?

1.4 Demarcation

Period

The research period runs from August 30, 2024, the day the UEFA draw pairs Ajax against Maccabi Tel Aviv, until Mayor Halsema's press conference on November 8 at 12:30 p.m.

The process

The Inspectorate of Justice and Security's investigation focuses on the performance of the police and the NCTV's duties both before and during the unrest in Amsterdam. The police operate under the jurisdiction of the local authorities, with actions determined in consultation within the sub-triangle.¹³ and triangle¹⁴This triangle consists of the mayor, the police, and the Public Prosecution Service. However, the Inspectorate of Justice and Security does not supervise the Public Prosecution Service or municipalities and therefore does not provide an opinion on decision-making within the local triangle in this study. However, where necessary, the functioning of the triangle was examined to provide context for the findings in this study. This was done, for example, with the Major Special Operations Staff (SGBO).¹⁵ who works under local authority.

¹² The original research question was: "What information did the NCTV and the police have at their disposal? How was this information used for decision-making and implementation prior to and during the unrest in Amsterdam? And to what extent did this contribute to the police's actions?" Upon closer inspection, this formulation proved too restrictive. The emphasis was strongly on information provision and decision-making, resulting in other relevant aspects of task performance being overlooked. The revised research question clarifies that the study has a broader scope and also encompasses governance, collaboration, and equipment.¹³ The sub-triangle, comprised of officials from the Municipality, the Public Prosecution Service, and the Police, serves in an advisory role to the (larger) triangle, which includes the (deputy) mayor, (deputy) chief public prosecutor, and the chief of police. These sub-triangles are organized by police district in Amsterdam.¹⁴ The police operate under the jurisdiction of the local authority. Police action is determined in consultation within the so-called "triangle," which includes the mayor and the Public Prosecution Service (OM) in addition to the police.¹⁵ An SGBO is chosen in exceptional circumstances where regular powers and/or regular coordination are insufficient to eliminate the threat or protect the vital interests of society. In these cases, a special form of command and control or coordination may be chosen to carry out the police's duties. This is called large-scale or special operations. For a more detailed description, see Appendix 3.

The municipality of Amsterdam has established the 'Institute for Safety and Crisis Management' COT¹⁶ was asked to conduct an investigation into the municipal and administrative processes surrounding the unrest in Amsterdam and any lessons learned. These municipal and administrative processes will therefore not be included in the Inspectorate of Justice and Security's investigation, unless necessary for the actions of the police and the NCTV.

1.5 Research approach

To answer the research question, the Inspectorate of Justice and Security used the following approach.

Documents

The Inspectorate of Justice and Security requested and received all documents from the police and the National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (NCTV) relating to the preparation, execution, and evaluation of the events in Amsterdam. For an overview of the documents used in this investigation, see Appendix 2.

Interviews

For the interviews, the Inspectorate of Justice and Security spoke with police, NCTV, and municipal officials who held key positions on the day and in the lead-up to Kristallnacht and the Ajax-Maccabi Tel Aviv match. The Inspectorate also spoke with two European Liaison Officers from Israel. A total of 38 people were interviewed.¹⁷ All interviews were transcribed by the Inspectorate of Justice and Security, and the draft reports were submitted to the respondents for review. Any factual inaccuracies were subsequently corrected.¹⁸

Standards framework

The Inspectorate of Justice and Security assesses the quality of the tasks performed by organizations based on four supervisory aspects: governance, cooperation, information provision and equipment¹⁹ These aspects constitute essential preconditions for effective task performance and are defined as follows:

- Governance: the process that ensures organizational goals are achieved. This includes management, control, internal oversight, and accountability. Key principles are efficiency, effectiveness, legality, and coherence.
- Collaboration: the coordination and joint efforts of organizations or organizational units to achieve a shared goal. This aspect focuses on information sharing, coordination, and the definition of common objectives.
- Information provision: the extent to which organizations have access to the correct, complete, and up-to-date data necessary to perform their tasks. This includes criteria such as timeliness, accuracy, completeness, and traceability.
- Equipment: the availability of resources such as personnel, equipment, finances, authority, powers, and knowledge necessary to perform tasks effectively.

¹⁶ In its early years, COT stood for 'Crisis Research Team'; now expanded to 'Institute for Safety and Crisis Management'.¹⁷ 15 interviews with the NCTV (including 2 interviews with 3 officials simultaneously), 3 officials from the municipality of Amsterdam, 18 police officials, and 2 officials from the Israeli embassy.¹⁸ Justice and Security Inspectorate, Protocol for the working method.¹⁹ Guidance on supervisory aspects of the JenV Inspectorate.

When assessing the quality of task performance, each of these four aspects is tested, both separately and in conjunction with each other.

Figure: 1. The four essential aspects of task performance quality



Reporting

The Inspectorate of Justice and Security (JenV) has documented its findings in a draft report, which has been submitted to the police and NCTV for review for factual inaccuracies. Where the review revealed factual inaccuracies in the report, these points were amended. The responses and amendments are presented in the review tables. These tables are published as a separate section of this report.

In this report, the Inspectorate of Justice and Security does not refer to the activities of individual (responsible) officials. The actions, activities, and/or decisions are referred to by the organization or organizational unit where the official in question worked. Quotations from interviews are referenced by the interview number of the corresponding interview, not by the official's (position) itself.

1.6 Explanation of terminology used in this report

In this report, the Inspectorate of Justice and Security uses several terms that may have different meanings for the reader. Below, the Inspectorate of Justice and Security provides further explanation of these terms so that it is clear what the Inspectorate of Justice and Security means by them in this report.

Type of violence

This report, based on the documents and interviews provided, distinguishes between two types of violence: hit-and-run attacks and so-called flash attacks. This distinction is necessary because it clarifies that the nature and dynamics of both forms of violence differ, which has direct consequences for how the police had to anticipate and respond. The tactical and operational efforts required to control these types of violence differed significantly depending on the type of attack.

• Hit-and-run (attack)

A form of attack in which a group of rioters deliberately tries to isolate individuals from another group, physically assaults them, and then quickly withdraws to their own group. These actions occur in the context of a group confrontation, with the attackers primarily targeting small groups or individuals who stray from the larger crowd. The attacks are short, intense, and intended to deter or harm the opponent without engaging in prolonged direct combat. This type of attack is often seen in clashes between rival groups of football supporters.

• Flash (attack)

A form of hit-and-run where individuals or small groups move quickly through an area to attack individual "opponents." These attacks are carried out using vehicles such as fat bikes, scooters, taxis, or on foot and are characterized by their speed, dispersal across multiple locations, and the absence of direct group confrontation. The perpetrators select their victims based on physical characteristics and strike when the police are not immediately present. Unlike hit-and-run attacks, which take place within a "defined conflict zone," flash attacks are characterized by their unpredictable nature and the rapid movement of the perpetrators. This creates a situation in which the police struggle to intervene immediately and effectively. The Amsterdam riots involved physical attacks on individuals or small groups of people perceived as Jewish, regardless of their actual background.

The term 'flash attack' was first used by the police themselves to describe this form of violence.²⁰

They demonstrate

A demonstrator is a person who, individually or as part of a group, participates in a public demonstration to express a point of view, opinion, or protest. This can take various forms, such as a protest march, a sit-in, or a symbolic action. Legally, a demonstration falls under the fundamental right to freedom of assembly and demonstration, as long as the demonstration is peaceful and within the legal framework.²¹.

²⁰ Peter Holla, "Police to combat 'flash attacks': 'We were really attacked that night after Ajax-Maccabi Tel Aviv'," De Telegraaf, January 11, 2025.

²¹ See, among others: Article 9 of the Constitution, Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights, National Ombudsman – Right to Demonstrate, Guidelines for Police Demonstrations.

Rioters

A rioter is a person who knowingly commits disturbances of the peace, violence, or other criminal

acts in a public space. These individuals actively seek confrontation with opponents, law enforcement officers, or property, contributing to escalation and social disruption.

In this report, the term "rioter" can refer to either an individual from the Maccabi Tel Aviv supporter group or someone who identifies themselves as a Palestinian supporter²²This does not apply to peaceful demonstrators or supporters, but to individuals involved in aggression, sedition, or other forms of violence. The mere fact that someone sympathizes with a particular group or movement does not make them a rioter. A person falls within this definition if they actively contribute to disorder, such as fights, vandalism, obstructing police action, or deliberately seeking confrontations.

Where necessary, this report distinguishes between different groups of rioters. In such cases, for example, it explicitly refers to a "Maccabi Tel Aviv rioter" or a "pro-Palestine rioter."

1.7 Reading guide

Following this introductory chapter, Chapter Two provides a chronological overview of the key events of November 7th and 8th. This overview provides context and forms the factual basis for the analysis of the actions surrounding the riots.

In chapter three, the Inspectorate of Justice and Security analyzes the approach to the irregularities based on four supervisory aspects. This analysis shows how the parties involved acted and what this means for their performance.

Chapter four contains the Inspectorate's conclusions and recommendations. These are aimed at improving action in similar situations.

The report concludes with a concluding remark. This concluding remark emphasizes the importance of factual clarification, administrative restraint, and a realistic understanding of what police deployment requires under complex circumstances.

²² For example, through attitude and behavior: by shouting anti-Jewish and/or pro-Palestinian slogans.

2. Chronological overview of the events in broad outline

*This chapter provides a chronological overview of the events that occurred between August 30 and November 8, 2024, and the organizations that played a role in them.*²³

2.1 Preparations

30 augustus 2024: 'the draw for the Europa League Ajax - Maccabi Tel Aviv

The UEFA Europa League draw will take place in Monaco on August 30, 2024. This draw will determine Ajax's place.²⁴ on Thursday, November 7 in Amsterdam against Maccabi Tel Aviv²⁵ plays.

The risk assessment for this match is being conducted in consultation with the Central Information Point for Football Hooliganism (CIV), the authorities in the clubs' home countries, and UEFA. This assessment will take into account potential threats to public order and safety.²⁶ Although Maccabi Tel Aviv's two largest supporter groups, The Maccabees and the Ultras Maccabi Tel Aviv, are known for their fanaticism, they are not considered violent. Therefore, the match between Ajax and Maccabi Tel Aviv is not considered to pose any particular risks in terms of potential supporter violence.

Still, it is clear to those involved²⁷The broader geopolitical context plays a significant role. The war in Gaza adds an extra dimension to the security assessment that goes beyond just the match itself. The Palestinian-Israeli conflict's influence on the atmosphere surrounding matches was already evident on March 7, 2024. Maccabi Tel Aviv played Olympiacos in Greece, during which several incidents occurred between Maccabi Tel Aviv supporters and pro-Palestine supporters before the match. According to those directly involved, this emphasized the importance of a thorough security analysis for the match in Amsterdam.²⁸

²³ The sources used by the Inspectorate of Justice and Security for this chronological overview are the police registration systems, the municipal and police timelines, and the documentation (journals, logbooks, etc.) mentioned in Chapter 1.

Interviews with officials involved were also included in this description.²⁴ Amsterdam Football Club Ajax, abbreviated to AFC

Ajax or simply Ajax, is a Dutch professional football club from Amsterdam. The club was founded on March 18, 1900.²⁵

Maccabi Tel Aviv Football Club is a football club from Tel Aviv, Israel. The club is part of the Maccabi Tel Aviv Association and was founded in 1906.²⁶

See also the letter from the Mayor of Amsterdam on behalf of the Triangle to the Amsterdam City Council; 'Violence in Amsterdam surrounding the Ajax-Maccabi Tel Aviv match', November 11, 2024: *'The police are basing their preparations on an intelligence report compiled from various sources. A key source is the Central Information Point for Football Hooliganism (CIV), which collaborates with local football associations and UEFA, the organizing committee. For this match, the police contacted the National International Legal Assistance Centre, which put them in touch with the Israeli Foreign Liaison Officer (FLO), stationed at the Israeli embassy in The Hague. Through this FLO, the police were put in touch with Maccabi Tel Aviv security officials and the Tel Aviv police, who were well-informed about the club.*

²⁷ Interviews o.a.: 953677, 314189, 871483, 671769. ²⁸ Interviews o.a.: 871483, 953677, 441094, 800827.

October 9, 2024: 'start of operational preparation'

Although the Ajax - Maccabi Tel Aviv match does not have a high risk level from a football perspective, the broader context does entail risks, as those involved say.²⁹ The tensions between Israel and Palestine and their impact in the Netherlands mean that this match is classified as a 'high-risk match'³⁰ is being considered. A police officer involved says about this:

*'because there was a chance that the Ajax-Maccabi Tel Aviv match could create a certain dynamism at a time when many demonstrations arise from all the developments in the Middle East.'*³¹

For this reason, the police decided to set up a Large-Scale and Special Operations Staff (SGBO).

On October 9th, the police's operational preparations will begin with a meeting of the SGBO (Committee for the Safety of the City). Initial insights will be shared and operational agreements will be made during this meeting. At that time, it was still unclear to those present how many Maccabi Tel Aviv supporters would be coming to Amsterdam and whether an organized fan walk would take place. There was also no information yet about the Israeli supporters' accommodations or arrival locations.

Security risks are being considered, partly due to incidents at previous European matches. For example, riot police had to intervene at Ajax's matches against Jagiellonia Bialystok and Besiktas. Potential demonstrations are also a concern: pro-Palestine demonstrations regularly take place in Amsterdam. There are concerns that Maccabi Tel Aviv players and/or supporters could be targeted by these demonstrations. Moreover, AZ plays at home against Fenerbahce on the same evening.³²Fenerbahce supporters often stay in and around Amsterdam and are known for their strong anti-Israel sentiment. Various measures were discussed during the meeting. For example, a preference was expressed for moving a potential fan walk to the Arena and not allowing a march through the city.

Regarding the police deployment, a significant presence of supporter groups and potential protesters is anticipated: four platoons of riot police, a squad of arrest units, three squads of mounted police, and two dog handlers. In addition, the football squad will be on standby with a water cannon. Traffic flow and bus escorts will be coordinated with the Johan Cruyff Arena, Dutch Railways (NS), the Municipal Transport Company (GVB), and the municipality. Initial scenarios being considered include:

*'Public order disturbances, demonstrations at the stadium or in the city, confrontations with and/or between Ajax, Maccabi, and Fenerbahce supporters and/or groups of demonstrators in the city center during the afternoon/early evening, violence/attack against/on players of participating teams.'*³³

Until then, the SGBO's primary task is to coordinate and manage the football match and all aspects directly or indirectly related to it (such as fan walks and possible demonstrations).

²⁹ Interviews: 953677, 314189, 656547. ³⁰ Most matches are classified as Category A (low risk) or Category B (medium risk) and are handled by the district through a District Approach Team (TDA). This applies to almost all matches. C matches, on the other hand, are considered high risk and require the involvement of a District Action Team (SGBO).³¹ Interview 953677. ³² Fenerbahçe Spor Kulübü (or Fenerbahçe) is a sports club founded in 1907 in Fenerbahçe, a district of Istanbul.³³ Staff meeting October 9, 2024.

October 14, 2024: 'Triangle talks with Ajax'

The match of November 7 will be discussed in a three-way meeting on October 14 with Ajax³⁴Specifically regarding the match against Maccabi Tel Aviv, the General Commander (AC) in

charge of the "football portfolio" indicates that a large number of Israeli fans are expected, which will be visible in the city. The police deployment will be adjusted accordingly.

Ajax will adjust its frisking policy and limit the display of flags in the home stands to Ajax, Amsterdam, and Dutch flags. Israeli flags are permitted in the away section. Ajax will also participate in the sub-triangle³⁵ to make further arrangements.

Attention is also being paid to the legal aspects of announced demonstrations in the stadium. The sub-triangle will investigate this further. Furthermore, the handling of potential terrorist threats was discussed. During this meeting, the mayor stated that:

'[...] all activities surrounding Israel are thoroughly prepared with regard to terrorist threats and that there is close contact with the NCTV about this.'

October 22, 2024: 'subtriangle consultation on risks and scenarios'

In the first meeting of the so-called sub-triangle, possible risks and scenarios are discussed.³⁶ The police are using standard principles aimed at ensuring a festive, safe, and orderly match day. It is being discussed that police action should be escalating, including atmospheric actions such as a "corteo" or "entrada."³⁷ will only be restricted if fireworks or face-covering clothing are involved. It is clear that approximately 2,600 Maccabi Tel Aviv supporters will be coming to Amsterdam.

Several questions still need to be answered, as the minutes of this meeting reveal. These include: where the players are staying, how surveillance and security are organized, and whether anything is known about demonstrations. The greatest risks³⁸ which are provided are:

- Small clashes in the city centre between supporters and demonstrators.
- Demonstrations in the city and at the stadium.

- Attack on players.

³⁴ Minutes of the Amsterdam Triangular Consultation, October 14, 2024. ³⁵ The sub-triangle, comprised of officials from the Municipality, the Public Prosecution Service, and the Police, serves in an advisory role to the (larger) triangle, which includes the (deputy) mayor, (deputy) chief public prosecutor, and the chief of police. These sub-triangles are organized by police district in Amsterdam. The triangle also allows for the appointment of a so-called "football sub-triangle." This sub-triangle is responsible for preparing decision-making and carrying out the tasks of the triangular partners. This sub-triangle is formed by:

- A strategic OOV advisor from the municipality of Amsterdam;
- A public prosecutor in charge of the football portfolio;
- The football portfolio holder within the unit management team of the Amsterdam police unit; • A policy advisor for Management Support from the Amsterdam police.

When a sub-triangle is formed for a specific match, the relevant general commander from the police will participate. The Public Prosecution Service may also appoint another public prosecutor or policy officer. ³⁶ Subtriangle report October 22. ³⁷

A "corteo," also called a "fan walk," is an organized march of supporters to the stadium, often before a match. This usually involves singing, flags, torches, and other atmospheric elements. The goal is to build up the atmosphere and support the players. An "entrada" is a massive gathering of supporters at the stadium, often just before the match. This involves singing, jumping, and sometimes fireworks to give the players an impressive welcome.

³⁸ Another risk mentioned (which has a question mark behind it in the minutes) is: 'a possible attack on players'. This risk was removed from the list during the meeting of 24 October.

An important point of attention is the difference in policy between football-related measures (such as fireworks and face coverings) and the policy regarding demonstrations³⁹The resources that the police will deploy, including the Mobile Unit (ME), will also be discussed in this meeting.

Horses, water cannons, arrest units (AE), reconnaissance units, and drones. In addition, there are plans to deploy bus escorts and observation units.

This meeting also discusses the principles governing cooperation with the triangle. It was agreed that only if intervention leads to large-scale/massive police action will it first be submitted to the triangle as a critical decision:

*'If an acute and threatening situation arises in which violence is directed against the police or bystanders and this decision by the triad cannot be awaited, the police are compelled to take immediate action using all available resources. The triad will be informed of this immediately. An acute and threatening situation includes, among other things, throwing fireworks at the police or other bystanders.'*⁴⁰

It was agreed that the Public Order and Safety department of the City of Amsterdam would further develop the draft documents and share them with the police and the Public Prosecution Service (OM). The matter would then be discussed in the triangular meeting on November 4th.

October 24, 2024: 'Concretization of information and risk assessment'The second staff meeting will take place on October 24⁴¹ about the Ajax-Maccabi Tel Aviv match. During the meeting, security risks and operational measures will be discussed. The focus is on the expected arrival of approximately 2,600 Maccabi supporters (of which 300 are at-risk supporters).⁴², possible demonstrations and the impact on public order.

Key action points include monitoring pro-Palestine demonstrations and making decisions about supporter travel. Dam Square has been designated as a fan zone, but this overlaps with other demonstrations, potentially leading to tensions. Deploying special metro trains to prevent confrontations with commuters is being considered. Furthermore, Kristallnacht⁴³-commemoration a point of attention, given the presence of VIPs and possible security risks.

³⁹ In the event of football-related public disturbances, action is taken on the basis of the General Local Regulations, and in the case of demonstrations, action is taken on the basis of the Public Demonstrations Act.⁴⁰ Subtriangle report October 22, 2024.⁴¹ The SGB0 consultation is referred to as 'staff consultation'.⁴² Supporters belonging to the so-called 'hard core' of the football club and who may cause public order problems.

⁴³ Kristallnacht was a large-scale and violent antisemitic pogrom in Nazi Germany on the night of November 9–10, 1938. During this night, thousands of Jewish synagogues, shops, and homes were vandalized and set on fire by Nazis and their followers. The name "Kristallnacht" refers to the shards of broken glass that covered the streets after the destruction of Jewish property.

During the staff meeting it will be discussed whether the Kristallnacht commemoration falls within the responsibility of this SGB0 or whether it falls under the responsibility of (for example) a District Approach Team (TDA)⁴⁴ must be brought. The commemoration will take place at the Portuguese Synagogue and poses specific security challenges. Although the Royal Military Police (KMar) and the Royal and Diplomatic Protection Service (DKDB) of the police are responsible for security, the police remain responsible for mobility and public order.

The question is whether this can be integrated into the already complex SGBO's operations. The broader security context, including the planned demonstrations and football-related risks, is being taken into account. Should public order become a crucial factor, it is suggested, this could be an argument for keeping the commemoration within the SGBO. At the same time, it is recognized that combining this task with the SGBO's other responsibilities will be complex.

In addition to the immediate security measures surrounding the match, other factors are also being considered. For example, the AZ-Fenerbahçe match is being monitored, as Fenerbahçe supporters may travel to Amsterdam. The arrival of supporters via Schiphol Airport and their stays at various hotels in the city have been mapped, as have planned gatherings and travel movements. The police are preparing for a large-scale deployment with riot police platoons and flexible units.

October 29, 2024: 'Contact the mayor and NCTV about the Kristallnacht commemoration' On October 29, the Department of Coordination of Monitoring and Security (hereinafter: ACBB) receives⁴⁵ from the NCTV via the National Coordination Center (hereinafter: LCC)⁴⁶ A signal that several persons requiring protection (TBPs) from the National Domain will be present at the Kristallnacht commemoration on November 7th. A broad internal survey confirmed this. Based on this, ACBB decided to initiate preparations for this commemoration and cluster them within a single team.

Due to the unusual circumstances on November 7th, the mayor contacted the NCTV (National Coordinator Pieter-Jaap Aalbersberg) by phone on October 29th and requested that the Ajax-Maccabi Tel Aviv football match be included in the threat assessment. This request was forwarded to the ACBB.

Hundreds of Jewish visitors, including the Israeli ambassador, are expected at the Kristallnacht commemoration. A previous similar event, the opening of the Holocaust Museum in March 2024, was disrupted by protesters who accused visitors of complicity in genocide in Gaza. The mayor fears a repeat of such incidents.

⁴⁴ Large events or demonstrations can also be handled by a District Approach Team (TDA). This is done in cases where a basic team lacks sufficient staff to supervise an event. In such cases, staff from multiple districts are brought in to provide personnel. The request to establish a TDA can be submitted by a team leader. The district leader is responsible for the structure of the preparation and execution. The advantage of a TDA is that it allows for the effective deployment of the expertise available within the district. ⁴⁵ The Monitoring and Security Coordination Department (ACBB) implements the NCTV's system responsibility for monitoring and security. The NCTV is responsible for the design, maintenance, and operation of the system. Together with its partners, the NCTV aims to prevent (terrorist) attacks on people, objects, and services. They ensure that people, objects, and services can function as safely and undisturbed as possible, despite threats and risks. A limited group of people, objects, and services falls within the national government domain. The ACBB has operational responsibility for this specific group. ⁴⁶ The National Coordination Center (LCC), a partnership between the police and the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee (KMar), was established in June 2023. The police, the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee (KMar), the Public Prosecution Service (OM), and the NCTV (National Coordination Center for Security and Counterterrorism) meet in person to work in a coordinated manner on the preparation and coordination of security assignments.

October 30, 2024: 'information request by NCTV'

In accordance with the regular working process of the ACBB, the NCTV requests information from the General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD), the Military Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD) and the Information Hub for the Monitoring and Security Domain (IKDBB) of the National Information Organisation (DLIO).⁴⁷ The ACBB consults these parties and asks if they have any unusual observations regarding the Kristallnacht commemoration. The information obtained does not indicate a specific threat.

The ACBB also asks the Amsterdam police at the Conflict and Crisis Management department (CCB) what measures have already been taken so that the ACBB can make an assessment and whether additional measures are necessary.⁴⁸

Internal email correspondence from the NCTV shows that they saw no reason to recommend additional measures, but did recommend a so-called 'operational letter'⁴⁹ to be sent to the municipality of Amsterdam to emphasize the importance of an undisturbed commemoration and to inform parties about the gathering of various Rijksdomein members⁵⁰.

The timeline indicates that the municipality, through the mayor, also inquired about possible risks regarding the Ajax-Maccabi Tel Aviv match.

October 30, 2024: 'triangle decides on one SGB0'

On October 30, the triangle decided to bring the coordination of the Ajax – Maccabi Tel Aviv football match and the commemoration of Kristallnacht under one SGB0.

October 31, 2024: 'Development of coordination and further identification of risks' During the staff meeting of October 31st, it was explicitly stated that both the football event and all its associated aspects, as well as the commemoration of Kristallnacht, fall under the SGB0. The AC stated that:

This event falls under SGB0. On the 7th, we have two events: the competition and the commemoration at the Jewish Synagogue.

The parties involved discuss the risks of both events in conjunction. They mention, for example, the potential clash between pro-Palestine protesters and Maccabi supporters, and the need to relocate demonstrations to avoid disrupting the commemoration of Kristallnacht. In this context, they point out that the opening of the Holocaust Museum and the commemoration of the attack on Israel earlier this year led to strong criticism of the mayor and the police actions.

⁴⁷ NCTV logging. Furthermore, the NCTV Analysis Department had no other sources of information at its disposal, and no internet searches, such as those on social media, were conducted prior to the match or during the unrest. The NCTV did not specifically request information from partners about potential terrorist threats at the football match.

⁴⁸ Interviews 194730, 284252, 219458. ⁴⁹ An operational brief is a document that shares specific information, instructions, or points of interest relevant to the execution of a specific task or operation. In the context of security organizations like the NCTV, an operational brief can, for example, provide information about a threat assessment or specific risks, identify points of interest relevant to decision-making or execution, call for cooperation or coordination with other parties, and outline specific operational consequences of an event or situation.⁵⁰ The NCTV is responsible for a limited group of individuals (and objects and services) within the national government's domain on behalf of the central government. This group is included on a so-called exhaustive list due to the national interest involved in their safe and uninterrupted functioning. These individuals are referred to as "National Domain Members."

Protesters were criticized for standing too close, and there was dissatisfaction with the lack of enforcement against certain statements. This led to political pressure and criticism of the approach taken by public order enforcement.

Approximately 2,600 Maccabi supporters and 200 VIPs are expected for the match. They consider potential confrontations between supporters and the pro-Palestine demonstration to be the main risks. They are considering protests and dissenting voices surrounding the match. In this context, they are discussing the fan walk, possible routes, and how to separate protesters and supporters. They intend to achieve this by increasing police presence and working with the Municipal Transport Company to regulate travel and prevent unwanted confrontations.

The fan flows are being managed so that Maccabi supporters don't travel through Central Station, as pro-Palestine demonstrations take place there daily. The triangular consultation, it is stated, has decided to gather the supporters on Dam Square, after which they will travel via Weesperplein to the Arena, escorted by police and riot police. This is believed to significantly reduce the risk of confrontations. In addition, strict surveillance will be maintained on the Damrak to prevent unwanted encounters between groups of supporters.

The SGBO explicitly discusses the various aspects related to the organization of the Kristallnacht commemoration. The commemoration takes place in the Portuguese Synagogue and is considered a potentially risky event due to previous disruptions of Jewish gatherings and an increase in antisemitic expressions. They anticipate possible pro-Palestine demonstrations, although no concrete indications have been received at this time. The police's Public Order and Intelligence Team (TOOI) monitors signals of potential disruptions but has so far received no concrete indications of possible actions. The minutes state the following:

TOOI is watching, but there's no concrete evidence. Potentially a magnet for attraction.

To prevent visitors to the commemoration from becoming targets for disruptions, the parties involved have agreed to move any protesters to Waterlooplein, out of sight and sound of the synagogue. They will also provide additional security and police presence, including monitoring of visitor flows.

November 1, 2024: 'scenarios are discussed in subtriangle'The November 1st sub-triangle meeting will focus on scenarios and associated security measures surrounding the Ajax-Maccabi Tel Aviv match, potential unrest in the city, and the Kristallnacht commemoration. The parties involved will discuss the logistics and risks of the fan walk, monitoring supporters, protesters, and other attendees, and the deployment of police.

Two possible routes for the fan walk are being discussed: via Central Station or via Weesperplein. The latter is preferred to avoid confrontations at Central Station and to maintain greater control over the movements of Maccabi supporters. Police are preparing for the presence of at-risk supporters and checking for fireworks or other prohibited substances. Ajax is implementing additional security measures in the stadium, including a ban on Israeli and Palestinian flags in the home sections and a check for concealed objects and explosives. The GVB (public transport company) is providing two reserved metro trains to transport Maccabi supporters directly to the stadium.

The sub-triangle foresees potential confrontations between pro-Palestine protesters, football fans, and other groups in the city. Dam Square is considered a risk area, with protesters targeting the presence of Maccabi supporters being taken into account.

23

The approach to the unrest in Amsterdam on November 7 and 8, 2024

Two scenarios are discussed: if individuals make comments against supporters, enforcement will be carried out on the basis of the General Local Bylaw (APV)⁵¹If there is an organized demonstration, it will be redirected to Beursplein. This square will serve as an alternative location for all counter-demonstrations. The meeting also stipulates that the police can take preventative action in the event of public order disturbances, deploying additional units to prevent escalation.

The Kristallnacht commemoration must proceed without disruption. It has been agreed that demonstrations may take place, but not in the immediate vicinity of the commemoration. Police will focus on protecting the commemoration and ensuring that the VIP route remains free of disruptions.

November 3, 2024: 'notice of demonstration at the Arena' On November 3, the City of Amsterdam received notice of a planned demonstration on Thursday, November 7, from 5:00 PM to 11:45 PM at the main entrance of the Johan Crujff Arena. The purpose of the demonstration is:

"[...] against the presence of Maccabi Tel Aviv Football Club during a genocide against Palestinians. [...] against Ajax Football Club, which makes their presence possible. And to raise public awareness of the match."⁵²

November 4, 2024: 'sharing images and possible courses of action' The fourth Staff Meeting on the Ajax-Maccabi Tel Aviv match and the commemoration of Kristallnacht will take place on November 4, 2024. The meeting will present the main information. Regarding the Kristallnacht commemoration, it has been confirmed that a large number of invited guests will be present, including the Ministers of Justice & Security and Asylum & Migration, and the US Ambassador. Significant media attention is also expected.

The current situation is described as tense, partly due to recent incidents involving fights and, in one case, the use of a fake firearm. At the same time, there has been no official announcement of counter-demonstrations, and Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) channels remain silent.⁵³ However, it is taken into account that there will be a counter-voice.

Regarding the Ajax-Maccabi Tel Aviv match, it is noted that posters have been found with the text 'Kick Israel out of UEFA', and that there is increasing negative attention to the match on social media.

The position of Ajax supporters and their attitude towards the match is also discussed. Within Ajax's core, there are conflicting signals about the treatment of Maccabi supporters. It is disputed that Ajax supporters will actively align themselves with Maccabi Tel Aviv supporters. It was noted that an official statement issued by Ajax supporters states that political expressions are not welcome in the stadium and that Maccabi supporters will not be allowed access to the supporters' lounge.

⁵¹ The General Local Bylaw contains the statutory rules, which only apply in the municipality concerned.⁵² Notification of demonstration, case number: Z/24/2850625.⁵³ Information gathering on the internet is largely conducted through OSINT. OSINT is a method that essentially gathers information from public sources. This can include data available online, such as social media, news articles, forums, blogs, and other public sources.

The staff meeting discussed the decision of the three-party coalition to move the fan walk from Dam Square to Central Station. The main considerations were that the previously considered route via Weesperplein was too long and risky, and also too close to the Kristallnacht commemoration. Moving the fan walk to this shorter route would have consequences for the location of demonstrators. The importance of a clear demarcation was emphasized. The following was stated:

"There's a need for an exact location where Triangle wants people to be. We want to be able to point to that."

Regarding the fan walk, attention is also paid to the safety of passersby. It is emphasized that a corridor must be established on both sides of the Damrak, so that bystanders can pass unhindered. Furthermore, this meeting confirms that a safety risk area⁵⁴ The municipality will designate a designated area from Dam Square to Stationsplein and the Arena. This will allow for preventative frisking. Regarding the demonstration policy, it is stated that swift and decisive action must be taken.

In the event of an escalation, immediate reference must be made to the Public Demonstrations Act (Wom). In the case of non-demonstrative riots, action will be taken based on Article 2.2 of the General Local Bylaw.⁵⁵

The meeting also addressed the notification of a demonstration at the Arena, where demonstrators against Ajax and Maccabi Tel Aviv intend to demonstrate at the main entrance of the ArenA. The three-party coalition agreed, as evidenced by the meeting, that it would be irresponsible to hold this demonstration in front of the ArenA entrance. According to the AC, the mayor has therefore proposed designating an alternative location, such as Nelson Mandela Park. Anton de Komplein was also discussed as a possible location. It was agreed that the organizer of the proposed demonstration would be contacted (by the "demonstration team").

Finally, operational matters were discussed. It was confirmed that additional reconnaissance teams and drones will be deployed, including for the fan walk and the Kristallnacht commemoration. The escort of the team bus was also discussed, with the caveat that it remains difficult to predict how supporters will travel to the Netherlands.

November 5, 2024: 'designation of risk areas, relocation of demonstration, organization of the fan walk'

In the November 5th meeting, the decision was made to designate Dam Square, the Red Light District, and the Arena area as security risk areas with the possibility of preventive frisking, based on a proposal from the sub-triangle.

It was also decided to move the planned demonstration at the ArenA entrance to Anton de Komplein. The reasons for this were:

⁵⁴ The mayor has the authority to designate safety risk areas (Article 151b of the Municipalities Act). In these areas, the mayor and the police have special powers to maintain public order and combat crime.

⁵⁵ Article 2.2 of the General Local Bylaw states: 'It is prohibited to participate in a gathering on or along the road or in a publicly accessible building or vessel, or to push unnecessarily, whether in a group or individually, to harass others, to fight, or otherwise to disturb the peace.'

'The enormous crowds around the JC [Johan Crujff] Arena on Thursday – some 56,000 football fans, visitors to AFAS Live, where a David Bowie Tribute concert is taking place that evening –, commuters during rush hour travelling via Bijlmer Arena, and late-night shopping visitors in the Arenapoort area (Woonmall, Decathlon, MediaMarkt, etc.) – combined with the fact that the area around the JC Arena has been designated a high-risk security area due to the likely presence of fireworks during the match, makes it operationally impossible for the police to manage these large crowds safely and responsibly, while simultaneously facilitating and protecting a demonstration around the Arena.'

The Ajax Supporters Delegation announced in a statement on social media and other media that it does not want any "politics" in or around the stadium. This also raises a reasonable fear of disorder between supporter groups and demonstrators.⁵⁶

Based on the above arguments, a Wom letter was drawn up and sent to the organizer of the demonstration the next day, November 6.

Regarding the fan walk, it has been confirmed that it will run from Dam Square to Central Station, starting around 5:30 PM. Dedicated metro trains will be available there to transport Maccabi supporters directly to the ArenA.

November 5, 2024: 'focusing images and practical implementation'The November 5th staff meeting built on previous discussions and focused on the final preparations, focusing on current risks and safety measures. The Head of Information (HIN) presented the information and noted that online sentiment was primarily focused on the ArenA. The announced demonstrations are circulating widely within more activist networks. Ajax fan groups do not want political statements made in the stadium and are prepared to intervene themselves.

There appears to be little online discussion about the Kristallnacht commemoration, keeping the risk of disruption low. However, an anonymous Crime Report has been received stating that Moroccan Ajax supporters intend to use violence against Maccabi supporters. However, TOOI and the police Football Unit do not confirm this. References to an incident involving a fight are circulating in the Moroccan online community. Within the SGBO, they note that "sentiments are simmering." This suggests, they say, that the situation may escalate further. Regarding the report, HIN concludes that there is currently no concrete reason to adjust the approach:

Within the Intel network, we are closely monitoring whether there is any online confirmation.

Based on the information, the threat assessment is not realistic enough to warrant additional measures, the conclusion is.

The meeting will discuss the decision on an alternative demonstration location for the planned demonstration at the ArenA on November 7th. Anton de Komplein and Nelson Mandela Park were previously considered. After discussions within the triangular group, Anton de Komplein emerged as the preferred location. However, the demonstration organizer maintains her position that the match must not go ahead. The police will maintain contact with the organizer and will explain the mayor's decision, it is agreed. The meeting will also lead to discussions about the development of various scenarios.

⁵⁶ Wom-brief, Municipality of Amsterdam, November 6, 2024.

It is expected that demonstrators will not adhere to the designated location. The previously agreed-upon policy remains in place: if demonstrators do not adhere to the designated location, reference will be made to the Wom letter.⁵⁷ and acted in accordance with Article 2.2 of the General Local Bylaw.

The participants also discussed the practical implementation of the fan walk. The walking direction was confirmed and the schedule established. The Municipal Transport Company was informed that the fan walk would begin at 5:30 PM, with a detour taking effect from 5:00 PM. This would ensure a smooth flow of traffic.

November 5, 2024: Operational letter from the NCTV

The so-called operational letter⁵⁸ which was previously prepared by the NCTV⁵⁹ Informs the relevant authorities (the police, the Amsterdam Chief Public Prosecutor, and the City of

Amsterdam) about the security measures surrounding the Kristallnacht commemoration on November 7, 2024, at the Portuguese Synagogue in Amsterdam. Regarding the football match between Ajax and Maccabi Tel Aviv, it is noted that:

On November 7th, a football match will also be held in Amsterdam between Ajax and the Israeli team Maccabi Tel Aviv. Although this is not a matter for the national government, for the sake of completeness, I would like to mention the conceivable implications for the commemoration or its attendees. I request the local authorities to give appropriate consideration to this.

The letter states that no specific threat has been identified towards the commemoration or those present. However, the general threat level in the Netherlands is substantial (4 out of 5), and the situation in the Middle East poses increased risks. Jewish targets may be attractive to terrorist groups, it is stated.

The letter also indicates there are no indications of organized demonstrations, but it is conceivable that pro-Palestinian groups are using the commemoration as a platform. The Amsterdam police unit, in consultation with the National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (NCTV), has prepared a series of measures, including a preventative explosives check, property security by the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee, and uniformed police presence during the commemoration. The NCTV endorses this approach and does not consider further measures necessary.

The NCTV endorses the existing measures and does not consider additional actions necessary, but points out that the local competent authority can take additional measures if deemed necessary:

*I endorse these measures and do not recommend any additional measures. This does not affect the measures that the local authority can take within the framework of its responsibility for public order.*⁶⁰

2.2. One day before the competition

November 6, 2024: 'morning and afternoon before the match'

The first Maccabi supporters arrived in Amsterdam on November 6th, heading to Dam Square and Rembrandtplein. Initially, there was a festive atmosphere, with supporters gathering in cafes and squares to prepare for the match. Police kept an eye on the situation, but there were no signs of unrest at that point. Social media was buzzing in the morning.

⁵⁷ The mayor sends a Wom order to the person who registered the demonstration (the organizer). A Wom order is a letter (Wom letter) in which the rules the mayor has imposed (in advance) on the demonstration are announced to the organizer of the demonstration.

⁵⁸ Letter NCTV, 5 November 2024, reference NCTV-8-203017.⁵⁹ See also in this chronological overview: October 30, 2024: 'Information request by NCTV and drafting of the 'operational letter'.'⁶⁰ The same.

The approach to the unrest in Amsterdam on November 7 and 8, 2024

And then the afternoon was still quiet. There were no online messages calling for protests or public disturbances.

There are currently no indications that pro-Palestine supporters are planning violent actions against the arrival of Maccabi Tel Aviv supporters. Police are monitoring various public information channels, including (public) WhatsApp groups.⁶¹, does not indicate any indications that additional preparations are required. Possible actions during the Kristallnacht commemoration are also being monitored.

The mayor of Amsterdam issues a designation decision⁶² Article 2.6 of the General Local Bylaw Amsterdam designates safety risk areas. These areas include the area around Central Station, Dam Square, and the Johan Cruijff ArenA, including the metro stations in between. The decree takes effect on Thursday, November 7, 2024, at 1:00 PM and will remain in effect until midnight on

November 7.⁶³

The decision shows that the combination of various risk factors, such as the presence of demonstrators, football supporters, potential confrontations, and fireworks, makes it necessary to establish risk zones as a preventive measure. In particular, it is stated that the fan walk from Dam Square to Central Station and the subsequent journey to the Johan Crujff ArenA are vulnerable moments where incidents can occur. The mayor, according to the designation order, considers the regular police enforcement capacity insufficient to prevent disruptions and is therefore establishing a security risk area. This gives the police the opportunity to implement preventative checks and other measures to keep the situation under control, according to the mayor.

November 6, 2024: 'early evening'

Later in the evening the dynamic changes, partly due to provocations on both sides and the presence of individuals who seem to be interested in more than just the match.

9:00 PM: 'a grim atmosphere'

In the evening⁶⁴ The atmosphere begins to grow grim. Around 2,500 Maccabi supporters are present in the city. Among them is a group of 500-800 at-risk supporters of the Maccabi ultras. Around 9:00 PM, police prevent a confrontation between pro-Palestine activists and Maccabi supporters at Stationsplein, where the daily pro-Palestine demonstration takes place. Pro-Palestine activists and Maccabi supporters insult and provoke each other. Several scuffles ensue, involving the two groups.

11:00 PM: Provocations on Dam Square, graffiti, and projections at the Arena

Around 11:00 PM, two incidents occurred in Amsterdam. First, Maccabi supporters walked over a Palestinian flag on Dam Square, provoking pro-Palestinian sympathizers. Around the same time, pro-Palestinian graffiti was sprayed at the Johan Crujff ArenA.

⁶¹ A public WhatsApp group is a group that anyone can join freely, usually via a public invite link. Despite this openness, it remains, legally and practically speaking, not a truly public source of information. In practice, a "public" WhatsApp group is a group for which an invite link has been publicly shared, for example, via a website, forum, or social media. Anyone with the link can join without an administrator's permission. Strictly speaking, it is not a public source because, although technically accessible, an action is still required (clicking a link and becoming a member); communication is still end-to-end encrypted; messages are not searchable via search engines and are not systematically published publicly; users assume they are communicating within a relatively closed circle, even if that circle is large.

⁶² Designation Decree pursuant to Article 2.6 of the General Local Ordinance Amsterdam (Safety Risk Areas around Central Station, Dam Square and the Johan Crujff ArenA area, including intermediate metro stations, 7 November 2024), 6 November 2024.⁶³ The mayor of the municipality of Ouder-Amstel simultaneously designates safety risk areas

for the same period for his municipality by means of a designation decree pursuant to Article 2.76 of the General Municipal Bylaw of Ouder-Amstel. These are areas that are adjacent to/border those of the municipality of

Amsterdam.⁶⁴ In the interviews the evening of the 6th November is referred to by the police as "early evening." The Inspectorate therefore maintains this terminology.

Projections against Israel and the F-side are also being shown with a projector⁶⁵ Ajax's graffiti was projected onto the stadium. After police intervention, those involved left the location without further incident. Police arrested four people in connection with the graffiti.

11:30 PM: 'violence in the city center'

After 11:00 PM, the situation escalated. Around 11:30 PM, police observed clashes on the Damrak, involving Maccabi supporters. CCTV footage showed fights breaking out around restaurants and fast-food chains. Injured Maccabi supporters were found by police. Aggressive and threatening messages against Maccabi supporters appeared on various social media platforms. Police were monitoring information and observed an increase in messages.⁶⁶ Police are present in large numbers to control the situation and prevent further escalation, but they cannot prevent groups of rioters, both Maccabi supporters and Palestinian supporters, from clashing.

⁶⁵ The F-side is a supporters' group for AFC Ajax, founded in 1976. It is one of the best-known and most notorious hard core groups (ultras) in Dutch football. The name "F-side" refers to the F-stand in the old Ajax stadium, De Meer, where the group originally met. The F-side also uses the nickname "Jews."⁶⁶ From: (among others) timeline Police Match 'Ajax - Maccabi Tel Aviv November 7' from police and Amsterdam Council letter November 11, 2024.

29

The approach to the unrest in Amsterdam on November 7 and 8, 2024

November 7, 2024: 'early morning'

12:20 AM - 12:50 AM: 'escalation of unrest, removal of the Palestinian flag'In the early morning of November 7, around 12:20 a.m., the emergency dispatch center received reports that a group of approximately 50 Maccabi Tel Aviv supporters had pulled a Palestinian flag off a building, blocking traffic. The emergency dispatch report stated:

*'[Reporter] reports that someone has climbed onto the facade and that a large group is standing around it'*⁶⁷

Spotlight: The removal of the Palestinian flag as a 'trigger'

The removal of the Palestinian flag from a squat on Rokin sparked strong reactions on social media. One interviewee explained this as follows:

The images of the flag [...] immediately caused a huge stir in those social media groups. Taking a flag is a minor incident in itself, especially compared to the incidents the Amsterdam police normally deal with. However, the international political context has given this incident considerable weight.

Trouw newspaper⁶⁸ describes this event as follows:

The seeds of the eruption of violence were sown a day earlier on Rokin, in the heart of the city center. Cheered on by his fellow countrymen, a Maccabi supporter climbed onto the awning of a souvenir shop. He hung with his full weight on a Palestinian flag belonging to the squat above. "Fuck you, Palestine!" dozens of people chant. It angers Amsterdam taxi drivers, many of whom have a Muslim background and sympathize with the Palestinians.

Some of the supporters are wearing face coverings, shouting anti-Palestinian slurs, and harassing people. The group then splits up. Some move towards Central Station and the Spui, while others head towards the Red Light District. The emergency dispatch report from 12:32 a.m. states:

*The group seems to be getting bigger. They're chanting slogans and harassing people.*⁶⁹ At 00:39 the police determined:

*'Some of them are heading towards the Red Light District, certainly some of the hard core, and we may still have to deal with this tonight.'*⁷⁰

Several people from the group walking on Rokin remove their belts and attack taxis with them. A police vehicle witnesses this. Scooter riders are also attacked with padlocks. Large numbers of police (including emergency services and the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee) arrive at the scene to restore order. Police also deploy riot police buses.

⁶⁷ Integrated Control Room System (CMS): reports morning of November 7. ⁶⁸ Trouw newspaper: "What exactly happened in Amsterdam last month? A reconstruction by Trouw and Bellingcat," December 6, 2024.

⁶⁹ Integrated Control Room System (CMS): reports morning of November 7. ⁷⁰ Integrated Control Room System (CMS). Reports on the morning of November 7th

1:20 AM - 2:30 AM: 'Taxi driver-Maccabi supporter confrontations' Around 1:20 a.m., police noticed several online calls urging taxi drivers to mobilize. It's known that a large portion of this group has an Arab background, is pro-Palestine, and shows strong solidarity with each other.⁷¹ In the following period, taxi drivers gathered at various locations, trying to locate the Maccabi supporters. They then drove to the Holland Casino on Max Euweplein, where approximately 400 supporters were present at that time. This group had already been there for several hours. At 1:40 a.m., the police saw a group of people gathering at the Holland Casino:

*"At Stadhouderskade near the casino, a large group of people, probably taxi drivers, were running back and forth near the casino. They were dressed in black and had hoodies."*⁷²

A minute later, a report of a fight in front of the casino is made. Almost simultaneously, a report

comes in from Holland Casino:

*Supporters are shouting inside, and the emergency alarm is pressed. Please have the police on site..*⁷³

Several scuffles broke out between rioters among Maccabi supporters and taxi drivers. Supporters fled inside. Once the police arrived, supporters were escorted out of the casino. Police buses were used to prevent a major confrontation between the taxi drivers and pro-Palestinian rioters on one side and Maccabi-Tel Aviv rioters on the other. Minor scuffles subsequently broke out around the casino.

2:30 AM – 4:00 AM: 'It remains restless'

In the following hours, unrest remained in various parts of the city. Reports were received of groups clashing. Police were struggling to keep the various groups separated. For example, a group of pro-Palestine rioters near Vondelpark refused to leave, apparently anticipating potential confrontations with Maccabi supporters. The police reported to the emergency dispatch center:

*'I want the group near the Vondelpark entrance to move towards Museumplein. First, approach them gently. If they don't cooperate, then advance, otherwise use force.'*⁷⁴

At 2:40 a.m. the Marriott Hotel reports:

*large group of boys with hoods on in front of the door.*⁷⁵

At 2:49 a.m., an online report via the Telegram app revealed that a group of Maccabi supporters were walking near Koningsplein and that there was no police presence, apparently intending to provoke a confrontation. The police anticipated this report. At 3:09 a.m., a brawl broke out at the Grand Canal Boutique Hotel. The message stated that Israeli supporters felt unsafe and requested a police escort.

'30 to 40 men want an escort to Dam Square, they don't feel safe'.

The police are monitoring groups in the city centre and see that there is unrest with 'running people, taxis and scooters', but do not see any criminal offences.

*Lots of taxis, lots of scooters, a lot going on here on Keizersgracht. People are also running around. I can't quite put my finger on it, I don't see anything illegal.*⁷⁶

Around 4:00 AM it is relatively quiet and the police scale down their presence.

⁷¹ Interviews o.a. 953677, 871483, 671769, 112927. ⁷² Integrated Control Room System (CMS): reports morning of November 7. ⁷³ The same. ⁷⁴ The same. ⁷⁵ The same. ⁷⁶ The same.

2.3. Match Day and Commemoration of Kristallnacht

November 7, 2024: 'morning and afternoon'

The morning of November 7th begins, as can be seen from the interviews⁷⁷, under heightened tension after the incidents on November 6, which involved taxi drivers and rioters from various groups (both from Maccabi Tel Aviv and pro-Palestinian supporters).

11:00 am: 'extra triangular consultation'

At 11:00 a.m., a special three-way meeting will be held to discuss the escalation during the night. Police deployment and scenarios will be discussed. Concerns are expressed about the aggression of Maccabi supporters and the reaction of taxi drivers. The three-way meeting will assess the operational intelligence and consider additional measures. The police deployment will also be

evaluated:

*The strict security measures and the large police presence are considered sufficient by the police.*⁷⁸

Partly due to the unrest in the early morning of November 7th, the police decided to increase the riot police force (from four to five platoons) because all the riot police called up to that point had already been subdivided into the operational plan as previously devised. The additional platoon could serve as:

*'a reserve on hand that could act as a "flying chicken" if the need arose.'*⁷⁹

12:15 PM – 1:00 PM: 'a restless start to the afternoon'

Dam Square serves as a gathering point for Maccabi supporters before they depart for the Arena. Around 12:15 PM, the first supporters arrive, and the group quickly grows. They chant anti-Palestine slogans. Police observe young people on scooters circling around them, keeping an eye on the Maccabi supporters and busily talking on their phones. An additional reconnaissance unit was deployed earlier, at 11:30 AM, by the police to monitor and assess the situation.

At 1:00 PM, pro-Palestine protesters were directed to the Spui at the direction of the triangle. Police observed a tense atmosphere, with the various groups present on Dam Square intent on clashing. A man with a bloodied face was found on Dam Square; he had been assaulted as he passed by, believing he was a Maccabi supporter.⁸⁰

Calls for violence against Maccabi supporters are circulating in WhatsApp groups and other social media platforms. A police OSINT officer is monitoring the messages in these groups.⁸¹ The reporting is being discussed with the Head of Investigation of the SGBO and the public prosecutor, assessing the extent to which the group shares information about public order problems and how to handle them. Around 1:00 PM, the number of Maccabi supporters on Dam Square increases, leading to direct confrontations with pro-Palestine supporters. Fireworks are thrown, and several scuffles break out. The police intervene to prevent further escalation.

⁷⁷ Interviews (o.a.) 671769, 871483, 823620, 441094. ⁷⁸ Letter to the Amsterdam City Council from Mayor Halsema regarding 'violence in Amsterdam surrounding the Ajax-Maccabi Tel Aviv match', dated November 11, 2024.

⁷⁹ Interview 441094. In a similar vein: interview 608389. ⁸⁰ SGBO briefing report, interview 414189. ⁸¹ Interviews 671769, 713084, Police Timeline, and WhatsApp group messages.

12:30 PM: SGBO kick-off briefing; sharing images and scenarios

The SGBO, responsible for safety outside the Arena, will give a start briefing at 12:30 p.m.⁸² The initial briefing focuses on public order and safety surrounding two events: the match between Ajax and Maccabi Tel Aviv and the Kristallnacht commemoration at the Portuguese Synagogue on Mr. Visserplein. Besides the original target groups—Palestinian sympathizers and Maccabi supporters—the briefing also mentions taxi drivers as a relevant factor to consider. One of the people involved says regarding taxi drivers:

*"This group of taxi drivers hadn't been discussed during the preparations because there was no information at the time that they might pose a problem. The confrontation between the supporters and the taxi drivers made it seem possible that this might be the case."*⁸³

In order to be prepared for possible barricades, a shovel was organized at the beginning of the afternoon to create a passage if necessary.⁸⁴ In addition, the permanent taxi rank at Dam Square

has been closed due to the risk of taxi drivers becoming involved in potential riots.

The briefing discusses that the SGBO's scope focuses on strategic locations where the various groups are expected to be present. This includes:

- The city center, where Maccabi supporters and pro-Palestine supporters mingle with the regular nightlife crowd.
- The Johan Crujff ArenA and surrounding areas, where the match will take place.
- Metro stations between the city centre and the Arena, in particular Central Station and Strandvliet, which play a crucial role in the movement of supporters.
- Mr. Visserplein, where the Kristallnacht commemoration takes place.
- Anton de Komplein, where the pro-Palestine demonstration was moved after a decision by the Triangle.

The AC emphasizes that the SGBO must remain flexible and be able to respond quickly to unforeseen developments. During the meeting, the operational management will present the strategic approach. The administrative scenarios will be discussed, with the premise that these must be translated into concrete police deployments.

*The administrative scenarios are described with the policy principles that have been translated into operational activities.*⁸⁵

These include:

- take swift and firm action against confrontations, both between supporter groups and between other target groups;
- actively intervene in the use of fireworks and face coverings, in line with previous instructions for football-related events;
- preventative work to spread out groups and prevent escalation, including through a heavy police presence and active monitoring of information.

⁸² The unit leadership has appointed a single SGBO (General Officer Commanding) with two Commanding Officers (AC). One AC is located in the Command Center with staff and focuses on security outside the Arena. The other AC is present in the Arena with the stadium commander, who focuses on security inside the Arena (football). As agreed, the sub-triangle is also present in the Arena during the match. The sub-triangle was located in the Command and Control Center until approximately 5:00 PM.

(CCC) and was later moved to the Arena as agreed.⁸³ Interview 441094. In a similar vein interviews 647896, 671769⁸⁴ Journal AC, interview 414189.⁸⁵ Interview 441094. In a similar vein: interview 800827.

3:00 PM: SGBO briefing on the current state of affairs

The 3:00 PM briefing at the SGBO Ajax-Maccabi Tel Aviv and the Kristallnacht commemoration will focus on the current situation and security measures in the city. At that time, the focus of police efforts will be on Dam Square, where approximately 500 Maccabi supporters are gathered. It is suspected that there are large numbers of fireworks among the Maccabi supporters; a bag containing cobras has been confiscated. Nine arrests were made at that time, primarily under the General Local Bylaw. In addition, two assaults were reported.

OSINT indicates that they are no longer dealing with the usual pro-Palestine protesters, but rather with individuals with malicious intent. There are also reports of approximately 50 Fenerbahçe supporters on Utrechtsestraat, but according to the police, they appear to have no malicious intent. Information also indicates that pro-Palestine protesters know which hotel the Maccabi players are staying in, although no concrete threat has been identified at this time.

The AC confirms that no changes in deployment are necessary and that current capacity is sufficient to keep the situation under control.

3:00 PM – 5:30 PM: 'strategy of have a robust presence seems to work' The strategy of maintaining a robust presence at known (risk) locations to prevent or immediately end confrontations is working well, as indicated in the SGB0's second staff briefing at 5:00 PM. This means that the police are present at the previously known (risk) locations to prevent or immediately end confrontations. By immediately anticipating, they hope to nip potential violence in the bud. This is successful, as evidenced by the events at that time; there are some clashes and acts of violence, but they are manageable. It is a difficult task for all police units to keep the various groups separate and manageable:

"All afternoon and in the run-up to the fan walk [...] pro-Palestine supporters and Maccabi supporters tried to get together and fight each other. We had our hands full keeping these groups apart."⁸⁶

Based on OSINT intelligence and by the reconnaissance unit on the streets, potential hot spots are being monitored. In addition to Dam Square and Spui, the police are focusing on the players' hotel, the Strandvliet metro station where taxi drivers gather near the Arena, and the synagogue where the Kristallnacht commemoration is taking place. The area around Central Station and the metro ride (plus intermediate stations) to the ArenA must also be taken into account. Anton de Komplein is also being monitored due to the demonstration scheduled to take place there early in the evening.

November 7, 2024: 'late afternoon and evening'

5:30 PM – 6:30 PM: Maccabi supporters' fan walk and influx into the ArenA In the early evening, a temporary calm returns. Most Maccabi supporters disperse through the city to eat before the fan walk begins and the journey to the Johan Cruijff ArenA.

The fan walk begins around 5:30 PM on Dam Square. Supporters gather here in the lead-up to the match. Police escort the group to Central Station, where specially reserved metro trains are waiting for supporters to travel to the ArenA. During the fan walk, supporters shout slogans in Hebrew. It later turns out that some of these slogans are (also) very offensive. Racist slogans. A group of people wearing face coverings walks at the front. The police keep an eye on them but don't intervene. As they move, the police receive signals that rioters targeting the Maccabi supporters are in the area.

⁸⁶ Interview 441094. In a similar vein: interviews 823620, 871483 and police timeline.

Some of these rioters mingle with bystanders, while others follow the supporters' movements on scooters. Police monitor the situation with reconnaissance units and CCTV to prevent potential confrontations. The police form a corridor through which the Maccabi supporters move.⁸⁷ This prevents Maccabi supporters and other groups from coming together.

Upon arrival at Central Station, police immediately escorted supporters to reserved metro trains. The flow of passengers was controlled. A single arrest was made during the transfer, but this did not affect the further course of the operation.

Around 6 p.m. there are reports on social media of possible imminent hit-and-run actions⁸⁸ At the Strandvliet metro station. Police received signals that taxi drivers were being called to meet at the

Strandvliet metro station. That's where the Maccabi supporters were getting off. The police received information that "Jews are going to be hunted down," and "we're going to catch them at the Arena."⁸⁹ There is also discussion about face coverings and mobilizing additional personnel. The information reveals a clear intention to seek confrontation. Despite the threat of disruption, the Maccabi supporters reached the Johan Cruijff Arena without incident. Police continued to monitor the movements of the various groups. They stated (afterward) that this information position allowed the team to effectively anticipate potential disturbances:

*One example is that there were plans to confront the outflow at Strandvliet metro station after the fan walk. [...] it was true that mobilization took place there.*⁹⁰

The stadium opens around 6:30 PM, and Maccabi supporters stream into the Arena for the match without any significant problems.

6:30 PM: Start of the Kristallnacht commemoration

The Kristallnacht commemoration begins at 6:30 PM. Approximately 650 visitors, including numerous dignitaries, will attend. This requires meticulous preparation from the Head of Surveillance and Security, in collaboration with services such as the Royal and Diplomatic Protection Service and foreign security personnel. To anticipate potential public disturbances, a detachment of a police bus, community police officers, and ultralight motorcycles (ULMs) are on site. Police are also present in the Crisis and Command Center (CCC), where the situation is being monitored in real time. The previous briefing emphasized:

Previous commemorations have been peaceful. Given the current sentiment, there is a risk of disruption.

⁸⁷ Interview 713084. ⁸⁸ For further explanation, see Chapter 1, paragraph 6: 'Explanation of terminology used in this report'. ⁸⁹ Interview 823620. In a similar vein, also police timeline. ⁹⁰ Interview 671769.

Various scenarios requiring a specific approach have been considered. Possible scenarios include demonstrations or one-on-one protests in the vicinity of the commemoration,⁹¹ and disruptions or reactions during the commemoration⁹² There will be no public disturbances at the time the commemoration begins. The Signal app group for the sub-triangle reads:

'Image commemoration: quiet'.

6:30 PM – 9:00 PM: Demonstration at Anton de Komplein and riots The (relocated) demonstration⁹³ The Ajax-Maccabi Tel Aviv match at Anton de Komplein is scheduled to begin around 6:30 PM. Police have been monitoring this location throughout the afternoon, as well as the surrounding area where taxi drivers have gathered in the afternoon following calls on social media to attack Maccabi supporters at the Arena.

Although according to the notice⁹⁴ The demonstration was supposed to start around 5pm, but it wasn't until around 7pm that a steady influx of participants began.

*"[...] it remained unclear for some time whether the demonstration would even take place. The feeling was that [...] there would be no demonstration at all. Eventually, contact was made with the organizer, who announced that the demonstration would begin around 7:00 PM."*⁹⁵

The Peace Unit⁹⁶ is present and is making contact with the demonstrators. The police are monitoring both the demonstration and movements in the surrounding area. There are indications that⁹⁷ A large group of people is gathering in Southeast. The police are submitting this to the Tribunal to determine whether this group of people should also be considered a demonstration..

Shortly afterward, the police received further information that a group of young men and a group of approximately 40 taxis had gathered near the mosque. The peacekeeping unit was instructed to escort this group to Anton de Komplein as part of the demonstration. The police were unsure how to assess this group. Are they people who want to demonstrate or have something else in mind?⁹⁸ It remains unclear whether the group that gathered at the mosque wants to join the demonstrators at Anton de Komplein, but in the end they join this group.

⁹¹ The first scenario describes a situation in which an announced or unannounced demonstration or one-person protest takes place in the vicinity of the Kristallnacht commemoration. To ensure the commemoration proceeds safely and without disruption, announced demonstrations are moved to an alternative location in advance. If an individual invokes the right to a one-person protest, the mayor can determine where it may take place. Refusal to comply ultimately results in arrest. Unannounced demonstrations are relocated on the spot and disbanded if not complied with. The police close off Mr.

Visserplein and can, if necessary, remove demonstrators using riot police.⁹² The second scenario describes a disruption or reaction during the commemoration, in which individuals or groups interrupt the ceremony or seek confrontation. The police will act in a phased and de-escalating manner, aiming to end the disruption and prevent further escalation. Because a confrontation is not a protected right to demonstrate, criminal proceedings may be initiated. In the event of violence, the police will intervene immediately, separate the groups, and arrest suspects if possible. The public prosecutor will decide on further prosecution.⁹³ See earlier on this topic: chronological overview; November 5, 2024: 'focusing images and practical implementation'

⁹⁴ See earlier about this: chronological overview; November 3, 2024: 'notification of demonstration at the Arena'.⁹⁵ Interview 713084.

⁹⁶ The Peace Unit is a specialized unit within the Amsterdam police force, focused on de-escalation and communication during demonstrations, protests, and other public order situations. The unit is deployed to establish contact with demonstrators and other stakeholders with the aim of preventing confrontations and escalation.⁹⁷

⁹⁷ Taibah Mosque (in full: Djame Masdjied Taibah) The Taibah Mosque is an Islamic prayer house in Amsterdam Southeast, located on the Kouwenoord in the Bijlmermeer district.

⁹⁸ Interviews: 441094, 797115, 656547, 953677.

The demonstration quickly grows to about 150 people.

*"Young people and other people who normally wouldn't have been there soon showed up at this demonstration. The [original] demonstrators then indicated they were withdrawing because they knew they and the police wouldn't be able to control the situation."*⁹⁹

Then, small groups begin to split off, presumably to head towards the ArenA via the shopping center or Bijlmerdreef. This is against the agreement. It was supposed to be a "static" demonstration at Anton de Komplein. At that point, it becomes clear that the demonstration is taking a different turn.

The demonstration suddenly became dynamic, while we had prepared for a static demonstration. We weren't prepared for this.

The police request the deployment of riot police to prevent the crowd from moving from Anton de Komplein to the ArenA, where supporters are entering the stadium. This requires swift action because the distance to the ArenA is short. However, it takes some time before the riot police are given the green light. When the riot police finally arrive and charge on Hoogoorddreef, several peacekeeping officers suddenly find themselves between the riot police and the demonstrators. As a result, some of the peacekeeping units are caught between the confrontations in the shopping center and on Bijlmerdreef and have to hastily withdraw.

Serious confrontations occurred between riot police and pro-Palestine rioters who were doing everything they could to reach the ArenA. This was prevented by a heavy deployment of riot police. The police had to intervene several times with riot police, supported by dog handlers. Mounted police and arrest units. Ultimately, there were no confrontations between Maccabi supporters or other stadium visitors entering the ArenA and the rioters.

9:00 PM: SGB0 briefing; sharing images and exploring approaches and scenarios During the 9:00 PM staff briefing, the SGB0 reflected on the influx of supporters into the ArenA. They were pleased that police action prevented groups of rioters from reaching the stadium. Small groups attempting to break out were stopped by police. During these actions, fireworks and stones were thrown at the police..

Current intelligence suggests that plans are circulating on social media to continue the post-match protests. Pro-Palestine rioters seeking confrontations with Maccabi Tel Aviv supporters may be clustered around the ArenA and along the routes leading to Maccabi supporters' hotels. Online posts even mention targeted attacks on "Jewish individuals." Although these calls remain general and lack concrete details, police are suspecting hit-and-run operations.¹⁰⁰.

In addition, the briefing reveals that online reports are being shared about incidents at hotels where injured people were reportedly admitted. Hotel Leonardo West is particularly mentioned. Verification by the SGB0 shows that no reports were filed and that hotels known to the police could not confirm these reports.

⁹⁹ Interviews: 953677. In the same vein interviews: 713084, 441094, 656547 .¹⁰⁰ For further explanation, see Chapter 1 under 6: 'Explanation of terminology used in this report'.

Based on the information, the SGB0 decides to deploy police forces to hotels where Maccabi supporters are staying, the metro stations, and the city center in the second half of the match. The expectation is that the day's pattern will continue: hit-and-run attacks by pro-Palestine rioters against Maccabi supporters.. The previously established approach to the exit process will be maintained. Small groups of Maccabi supporters will not be escorted as a large group, but will be allowed to leave the stadium independently (individually). A key consideration is the expected arrival of a train carrying Fenerbahçe supporters from Alkmaar at Central Station. It is important that the Maccabi supporters have left the station before their arrival to avoid confrontations. The idea is that if the Maccabi supporters have mingled with other supporters leaving the stadium, there will be no large group that could pose a potential target.

During the match, things remained calm in and around the ArenA. Police in the city handled regular reports, with no incidents related to Israeli supporters. There were no sightings of groups on scooters or taxi drivers. Online, on open sources (social media), things remained relatively quiet

during the match, although the tone in various WhatsApp groups was grim. These groups also frequently exchanged information on "what the plan is after the match." Apparently, there was a plan to confront Maccabi supporters.

Regarding the commemoration of Kristallnacht, the briefing indicated that everything went well.

"Satisfied with the commemoration organizers. The effort and presentation looked great. [...] Together with the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee (KMar), we beautifully designed the Guard and Secure concept."¹⁰¹

¹⁰¹ SGBO Briefing 9:00 PM.

November 7, 2024: 'end of the evening and night'

After the match ends around 10:45 PM, the exit proceeds smoothly. There are no incidents related to the presence of Maccabi supporters in the city. Riot police are prominently present at the Arena at that time to quell any potential violence. The city remains relatively calm at this point.

10:45 PM: SGBO briefing

At the 10:45 PM staff briefing, it was discussed that the SGBO's perception of the information situation has essentially remained unchanged since the 9:00 PM briefing. Hit-and-run operations are still expected around the stadium "in the aftermath" of the evacuation.

"Aftermath refers to the potential plan discussed in the 9:00 PM briefing to carry out hit-and-run attacks on Jewish-looking people in the city center, possibly on their way to hotels. By hit-and-run attacks, the SGBO at that time meant the type of hit-and-run attacks that had been carried out all

day leading up to the match around Dam Square and the Arena, and which were successfully dealt with. These incidents consistently involved small groups of rioters attempting to attack groups of Maccabi supporters on foot."¹⁰²

By shielding the supporters, the police had been able to prevent these attacks up to that point.

The briefing also addresses potential scaling up and down. The decision is to invest in the outflow and the situation in the city center. Capacity is already available in the city center, and as soon as the ArenA has emptied, the existing capacity there will also be transferred to the city center. Because the support platoons have already been deployed for many hours and the SGBO estimates that the situation in the city remains manageable, they are being scaled down to one platoon. The offer from Noord-Holland for support (one platoon) is declined, as they had already been deployed for 12 hours and were only deployable until 1:00 AM.

The SGBO relief crew is already present at this time, but the current SGBO will continue for another hour to ensure a smooth handover.

10:45 PM – 11:55 PM: Exit from Arena, focus on risks and monitoring social media

In accordance with the 9:00 p.m. briefing, the SGBO moves one platoon based on the information image at around 10:30 p.m.¹⁰³ Riot police from the ArenA to locations along the route from the ArenA to the Central Station. Units were positioned at Strandvliet, Duivendrecht, Amstel, and Central Station stations (one section) and the area between Central Station and Dam Square (one section).¹⁰⁴ During the match, one platoon and five riot police buses had already remained in the city (distributed among hotels and the city center). A second platoon is now being added. This is partly because it is conceivable that incidents could occur between different groups, and partly because Amsterdam Central Station is a gathering place for pro-Palestinian groups and could become a logical location for confrontation. Given the search activity over the past few hours, the SGBO considers this a realistic scenario.

¹⁰² Police timeline. ¹⁰³ A platoon consists of 55 people ¹⁰⁴ A section consists of 27 people.

The SGBO estimates that it can remain 'in control' by maintaining the successful strategy and the measures taken thus far and sees no reason to change the strategy or inform the (sub)triangle.

The tone on social media, which was relatively calm during the match, became much more aggressive. The HIN news report stated the following:

The language directed at Israelis/Jews is extremely hateful and aggressive. Any form of violence against Israelis is justified. The routes to the hotels, particularly the Leonardo Hotel, are frequently mentioned. Update: It is being shared that "large groups of Jews are on Damrak, and that another fight just took place on Damstraat."

Videos of attacks on Israeli soldiers and wounded soldiers, accompanied by pro-Hamas rhetoric and references to World War II, are being shared in WhatsApp groups. Violence against Israelis is fully justified in these videos. The Head of Investigative Expertise and the Head of Investigation, among others, are discussing the criminality of these statements and the possibilities of using investigative resources to identify and possibly arrest those involved. The public prosecutor decides to take no further action.

At 10:58 PM, online chat groups are discussing what to do, given the limited success of the attacks

on Maccabi supporters thus far. One of the chats is about what "the Jews" are waiting for. The ArenA is mentioned as a location, but is also disputed, claiming there is too much police presence. At 11:13 PM, the focus of the messages on this topic seems to shift to the city center. Police are present at the Overamstel metro station and in the city center. Around 11:30 PM, police notice the first disturbances on Damrak near Dam Square. Fighting broke out around restaurants and a fast-food restaurant. Riot police were immediately deployed.

The exit from the ArenA, as well as the metro ride and arrival of Maccabi supporters at Central Station, proceeded smoothly and without incident. At 11:36 p.m., it was announced online that "they were exiting at Leonardi Overamstel." There was also online discussion about the Dam Square and Leidseplein assembly points, from which Maccabi supporters would be chased.

Other online posts called for Maccabi supporters to be chased from Dam Square and Leidseplein. At 11:38 p.m., new high-risk locations were identified: the Leonardo Hotel West (Staalmeesterstraat) and the Overamstel metro station. Police were already present at both locations.. Meanwhile, photos of Maccabi supporters and their locations circulated frequently online, and there was talk of a hunt for Maccabi supporters, with them being actively followed to their hotels.

At 11:44 p.m., Maccabi supporters' escorts contacted police and raised concerns about security at the two Leonardo hotels. Police confirmed that riot police were present and actively engaged.. Around midnight, Maccabi Tel Aviv rioters gathered at Central Station and headed toward Dam Square and the Spui. Along the way, they gathered materials such as metal bars and stones and sought confrontations with pro-Palestine rioters. Stones were also thrown at taxis. Simultaneously, another development took place: small groups of pro-Palestine rioters actively sought out individuals they perceived as Jewish, regardless of their actual background. So, they were no longer targeting only Maccabi Tel Aviv supporters.

The first 'flash' attacks begin at 11:55 p.m.¹⁰⁵ against Maccabi supporters on Dam

Square.¹⁰⁵ Flash attack: see Chapter 1, paragraph 6. 'Explanation of terminology used in this report'.

November 8, 2024: 'early morning'

12:00 AM – 1:30 AM: 'Explosion of violence'

At 12:04 a.m., police received the first report of an assault on Damstraat. Witnesses reported that an Israeli citizen had been attacked. Tensions continued to rise in the hours that followed.

"[...] the first fights broke out at Kentucky Fried Chicken on Rokin. You could see it happening before your eyes. From that moment on, things went off all over the city center."¹⁰⁶

Violent incidents are being reported at Dam Square, Rokin, Kalverstraat, and near Spui, among other locations. The pro-Palestine rioters are using various methods to reach their victims: some are walking, while others are using scooters or taxis to quickly move through the city. This is making it difficult for the police to intervene quickly and effectively. This appears to be a fundamentally different form of violence than what the police have previously encountered, which involved violence between opposing groups.¹⁰⁷

The riot police are present in the city at that moment, but prove insufficiently equipped to respond quickly to the scattered and agile flash attacks. The police respond to reports, but by

the time officers arrive on the scene, the perpetrators are usually gone. This pattern differs from the group violence scenarios anticipated earlier in the day.

"The riot police were well-equipped to handle the actions against rioters at Anton de Komplein. But for the actions in the city center, you can't do much with those large riot police vehicles. The police weren't equipped for that."¹⁰⁸

At 12:14 a.m., the triangle decides to extend the previously established Security Risk Area until 6:00 a.m. and expand it. The police begin assembling available units to better manage the scattered incidents. During a staff change at 12:15 a.m., a structural pattern is observed: small groups of attackers deliberately seek out isolated individuals, assault them, and then quickly disappear. The police are experiencing significant difficulties in responding effectively to this dynamic situation.

12:25 AM – 1:30 AM 'adjusting the strategy by the police'

At 12:25 a.m., the strategy was adjusted. From that point on, the police shifted their primary focus from arresting rioters to protecting Maccabi supporters. The riot police were ordered by the SGBO to round them up and take them to safe locations.

At 12:46 a.m., a riot police section departs from Alkmaar towards Amsterdam's city center to provide additional support. At 12:59 a.m., a group of approximately 150 Maccabi supporters is stopped on Dam Square and Spui. Police have set up secure zones where Maccabi supporters are received and protected. The police decide to use GVB buses to evacuate this group from the city center as quickly as possible.

¹⁰⁶ Interview 175874. ¹⁰⁷ For further explanation of the violence, see the distinction between "hit-and-run" and "flash attacks" in Chapter 1, Section 6: "Explanation of terminology used in this report." For more information on flash attacks, see Appendix 4. ¹⁰⁸ The same.

From 1:24 a.m. onward, reports of attacks decreased, but fear among Amsterdam's Jewish residents and tourists remained high. Several reports were received of people feeling unsafe and afraid to leave their hotels. Some reported being met by groups of men, while others said they were afraid to take a taxi.¹⁰⁹

The AC news report states that at 1:30 a.m. it is still restless, but the situation seems to be becoming more manageable:

'The city's image is still restless, but the unrest seems to be decreasing somewhat.'¹¹⁰

12:00 AM – 2:00 AM: 'NCTV front office contacted by Israeli embassy' The front office (hereinafter: FO)¹¹¹ The Head of Security at the Israeli Embassy calls the National Crisis Center (hereinafter: NCC) of the NCTV twice. The Head of Security reports that people in and around the stadium are being attacked and that the police are not present. In both calls, the NCC refers the Head of Security to the Amsterdam police, as this is a local matter. The NCC reports the handling of these reports back to the ACBB.

From 2:00 AM: Image deviates from actual situation

Although from the documents and interviews¹¹² While it appears from directly involved individuals that violence decreases significantly after 1:30 a.m., it is primarily the images circulated via social

media, (international) radio, and television that reinforce the image of ongoing chaos. These images—often without context and repeatedly distributed—contribute to a sense of insecurity and make it difficult to separate fact from perception. While the police are considering scaling down their response at that point (many of the people on the streets have already been engaged for over 15 hours), the perception persists that fighting is still raging everywhere. During this phase, the SGBO is primarily concerned with managing the public perception and bringing the situation back to a realistic perspective. One of those involved says:

"There were also many reports [...] that things were wrong at hotels. The police went to all of them. None of the reports turned out to be anything wrong. That's the chaos."¹¹³.

The process of escorting the Maccabi supporters to their hotels lasted until around 3:00 a.m. Some of the group was taken by ferry to Amsterdam-Noord, where the situation was calmer. Riot police units were relieved by colleagues who took over hotel security.

¹⁰⁹ Police timeline. ¹¹⁰ Journal AC. ¹¹¹ The front office of the NCTV's NCC is a 24/7 information desk. This office serves as the central government's single point of contact, both nationally and internationally. The FO's main tasks are monitoring, reporting, and alerting. The NCC may also receive reports from other parties about matters not yet reported to the media. The front office does not have access to information held by police systems.

¹¹² Interviews o.a.: 698542, 871483. ¹¹³ Interview: 698542.

3:00 AM – 7:00 AM: Sharing the first images of the violence and discussing measures

After the violence subsided in the early morning and relative calm returned, an immediate attempt was made to assess the situation. At the same time, it was clear that much remained unclear. Meanwhile, the first reports about the unrest were already appearing in (foreign) media. A meeting of the three-party coalition was held at 3:00 a.m., where they provided feedback on the situation in the city. While there were no more fights in the city, calls for violence continued to appear on social media, it was reported.

Around 4:00 a.m., the NCTV (Mr. Aalbersberg) receives a call from the Minister of Justice and Security about the unrest in Amsterdam. The NCTV has the NCC retrieve information from the National Unit's Information Officer (OvD-I). Starting at 4:30 a.m., the NCTV begins facilitating the various telephone conversations being held by the ministers and The Mayor of Amsterdam. The NCTV also advises the Prime Minister and the Minister of Justice and Security, given the political and international dynamics that have arisen. The NCTV does not escalate to the national crisis structure, as this is a local matter.

At 5:25 a.m., the Head of Mobility is called in to organize the escort of Maccabi supporters and players to Schiphol Airport. The AC contacts the NCTV around 5:30 a.m. This reveals that Israeli dignitaries are traveling from Israel to the Netherlands and that escorts are required upon arrival. The ACBB has begun organizing security for the Israeli ambassador and the Israeli Minister of

Foreign Affairs.

At 6:35 a.m., the police chief updates the mayor on the latest developments:

- The emergency services received 17 reports, 11 of which concerned fights. • A total of 5 people were injured, of which 2 people were taken away by ambulance, including one with a broken leg.
- The police escorted both the Maccabi players' bus and some supporters. • The Royal Netherlands Marechaussee at Schiphol Airport is scaling up to support law enforcement during departure procedures.
- Additional staff are also being deployed within the police organization itself.

The Israeli Embassy in the United States posts a message on X at 6:43 AM (local time in the Netherlands):

'Hundreds of fans of the @MaccabiTLVFC soccer team were ambushed and attacked in Amsterdam tonight as they left the stadium following a game against @AFCAjax. The mob who targeted these innocent Israelis has proudly shared their violent acts on social media.'

Subsequently, reports with similar wording appear in various (foreign) media.

At 7:00 a.m., the SGBO is relieved and the work is handed over to a new team that takes over coordination.

7:00 AM - 8:00 AM: 'Image formation and triangular consultation'

In the morning the situation in the city is tense but under control¹¹⁴A total of 62 arrests were made, of which 10 people remain in custody—the criminal justice process is a key focus. Police are starting to collect and analyze video footage to support their evidence. At the same time, missing persons reports are still being actively investigated. It soon becomes clear that the missing persons have been located, some of whom are in custody.

The aftermath of the unrest is also being felt within the police force itself: one officer has suffered hearing damage. Although no new hit-and-run incidents are observed at this time, the threat via social media remains. Calls for action are still circulating online and are being actively monitored. The police are systematically working through the list of hotels where they are staying, identifying any potential security risks at each location and taking appropriate measures where necessary.

At 8:00 a.m., the triad will meet to evaluate the situation in the city and take action following the previous evening's unrest. During this meeting, several decisions will be made to ensure safety in the city and prevent further escalation.

One of the first measures is the preparation of a city-wide security risk zone. This means that the police will have expanded powers for preventive action, including verifying the identity of individuals. Before this decision is finalized, a legal review will be conducted to ensure its legal viability and enforceability. Furthermore, a ban on demonstrations for the weekend will be

implemented. This decision is being made in light of the risk of further unrest. Simultaneously, the legal and operational consequences of such a ban and how enforcement can best be organized are being investigated.

Another important measure concerns additional security for Jewish institutions, city center hotels, and hospitals. Given the nature of the events, it is deemed necessary to better protect these locations. The necessary deployment and possible assistance from other units are being mapped out to achieve this effectively. A national meeting between police chiefs will take place at 10:00 AM, it is announced. During this meeting, available police capacity will be discussed and whether and where additional assistance is needed. This meeting should provide clarity on how the deployment of units throughout the country can be coordinated with the situation in Amsterdam.

In addition to the decisions taken, a concrete to-do list will be drawn up during the triangular meeting to ensure the measures are implemented effectively. The goal is to organize police deployment effectively and effectively, taking into account available capacity and developments in the city. External communication is a key focus.

¹¹⁴ Journal staff AC.

It is stated that clear communication about police deployment is essential. This requires a clear communication framework outlining what the police can and cannot do. This should help create realistic expectations for both the public and the relevant authorities. Furthermore, actions must be based on specific incidents and explicit observations. It must be stipulated that the police will only intervene in cases of actual criminal offenses or public order disturbances. This prevents arbitrariness and makes the response more targeted.

In addition, plans must be developed for police operations based on two scenarios. The low-profile deployment scenario assumes a restrained presence, intervening only if the situation escalates. The maximum deployment scenario identifies the necessary capacity and resources for a large-scale and visible presence, aimed at rapid intervention in the event of disturbances.

Finally, the required police capacity up to and including the weekend must be mapped out. This overview will serve as the basis for a national request for additional support from other units.

12:30 pm: 'triangle press conference'

The Triangle will hold a press conference on November 8, 2024, at 12:30 PM regarding the unrest in Amsterdam. During this meeting, Mayor Halsema will strongly condemn the violence against Israeli football fans and call it a "pitch-black night" for the city. The press conference will also address the preparations for November 7 and the collaboration with the NCTV (National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism), among others.

The mayor announces additional security measures, including an emergency ordinance for Amsterdam and Amstelveen, a demonstration ban for the weekend, and increased police presence

to maintain order and prevent further escalation.

Mayor Halsema also emphasizes the importance of solidarity with the Jewish community and calls on all Amsterdam residents to stand together against antisemitism and violence.

3. Analysis of the events and approach

In this analysis, the Inspectorate of Justice and Security assesses the deployment of the police and the role of the NCTV based on four supervisory aspects: governance, cooperation, information provision, and equipment.

Governance

The police operate within the framework of local government, with the triad of the mayor, the police, and the Public Prosecution Service playing a guiding role. Decision-making prior to the event is careful and based on risk scenarios. The police prepare thoroughly, identify threats, and plan appropriate deployment. Until the outbreak of violence in the early morning of November 8th, it appeared that the preparation for these risk scenarios, the structure of decision-making and action, and the management of the execution were working well in practice. The police responded effectively to most of the disturbances.

Large-scale, rapidly evolving public disturbances require immediate coordination and a high degree of flexibility in response. During the events in Amsterdam, the police demonstrated resilience by quickly adapting their response to the course of events. This was demonstrated, for example, by quelling several fights in the city.

At the same time, it's becoming clear that the police aren't always equipped to handle the unforeseen and highly fragmented nature of violence, where rioters move purposefully, strike quickly, and disappear before police units can intervene. This became apparent in the early morning of November 8th. These small-scale, rapidly executed attacks at dispersed locations (in retrospect)

place different demands on police deployment. Even then, the police respond quickly and adapt their strategy by concentrating threatened individuals in a safe location to protect them.

The NCTV operates within the system of surveillance and security. In accordance with the procedures for situations of increased risk for persons requiring protection within the national government domain, and at the request of the local authority, it applies its threat assessment process and informs relevant partners through an operational letter. Decision-making on measures lies with the local authority; the NCTV advises and informs. Although this division of roles is clearly defined in design, in practice, the boundaries of the NCTV's tasks and powers were not clear to all parties. The fact that identifying threats to public order (such as a football match) does not fall within the NCTV's remit is a case in point.

Following the unrest, the NCTV resumed its role in facilitating and coordinating national and international political activities and providing security for the Israeli Foreign Minister and the Israeli Ambassador.

Cooperation

Collaboration plays a crucial role in addressing these incidents. Within the SGBO and the triangular structure, there is structured coordination and decision-making, including regarding the relocation of the demonstration and the designation of risk areas. The police utilize multidisciplinary expertise and collaborate effectively with other agencies. This collaboration demonstrates agility by adapting quickly to dynamic situations. However, coordination between intelligence and implementation remains vulnerable, especially in the event of unexpected behavioral changes among rioters, for example, when interpreting the flash attacks.

Collaboration with the NCTV follows regular procedures. The NCTV shares threat assessments and information about national government officials through its operational briefing. This briefing emphasizes the importance of vigilance during events such as the Kristallnacht commemoration. The NCTV coordinates with the police and the municipality and contributes to a shared understanding of the risks, but is not involved in operational decision-making.

Information provision

The police's information position is sound prior to the events. They monitor risks, analyze real-time information, and coordinate via the information channels available to them. However, interpreting online signals, in particular, proves difficult: messages on social media spread rapidly and can fuel unexpected group formations. It is also questionable how much weight should be given to often violent (online) expressions. The findings show that the police respond adequately to the available information, but often have to act under extreme time pressure, which complicates preventive action. After all, online appeals can mobilize a large group of people in a short time, with the exact size and location of the mobilization often unclear.

The NCTV has its own information base, based on intelligence and security services, among other sources. In this case, no indications of a specific (terrorist) threat were received. The NCTV communicated this promptly and emphasized the importance of vigilance. This approach aligns with the existing process, although the case demonstrates that transparency regarding the interpretation of threat assessments to partners needs improvement.

Equipment

The police, with over 1,200 personnel, including specialized units, are able to respond to the anticipated risks. Drones, horses, arrest units, and other resources are deployed to prevent escalation. The police demonstrate a knack for improvisation, but are also confronted with rioters' tactics for which their usual structures are less than adequate. While the riot police are present in the city, they are insufficiently equipped to respond quickly to agile attacks at multiple locations simultaneously.

This case demonstrates that even with a large deployment of personnel and resources, as in Amsterdam, the limits of feasibility become tangible. Traditionally, the police prepare for large-scale public disturbances in concentrated locations. In this case, however, small, rapid, and unpredictable operations took place simultaneously in several locations. This calls for different tactics and possibly different organizational approaches.

The NCTV is not responsible for operational deployment, but focuses on analysis, interpretation, and national coordination. In this case, this task fulfills the requirements of the monitoring and security system and, more broadly, the NCTV's general task of identifying (terrorist) threats. The NCTV thus made a substantive contribution to the preparation and assessment process.

4. Conclusion and recommendations

Based on the analysis, the Inspectorate of Justice and Security reaches the following final conclusions.

Regarding the police

- 1. The police acted professionally and with great commitment in a demanding situation.**
- 2. The police demonstrated flexibility by responding quickly to the course of events. At the same time, the events make it clear that it is unrealistic to expect the police to maintain complete control over rapidly escalating and unpredictable developments under all circumstances.**
- 3. Events have shown that a strong information position and flexible action are decisive for managing complex situations and effectively tackling public disturbances.**

With regard to the NCTV

- 1. The NCTV acted in accordance with its duties in identifying potential threats surrounding the Kristallnacht commemoration.**
- 2. Clear communication about the tasks and limitations of the NCTV is essential to keep expectations of administrative and operational partners realistic and to prevent misunderstandings.**

Recommendations

Based on its conclusions, the Inspectorate of Justice and Security makes the following recommendations.

Recommendation to the Chief of Police

Continue to invest in refining information collection and its interpretation, and in developing flexible intervention strategies.

Recommendation to the National Coordinator for Counterterrorism and Security

Ensure clear and proactive communication about the NCTV's tasks, responsibilities, and limitations, so that administrative and operational partners have a realistic understanding of its role and options for action on security issues.

5. Final remarks: between foreseen and unforeseen – judging the police in a complex reality

The unrest in Amsterdam on November 7 and 8, 2024, demonstrates how quickly a situation can change and how complex maintaining public order is under such circumstances. The police and other involved agencies find themselves in a conflict of interests. On the one hand, they must keep groups separated and prevent conflicts from escalating. On the other, they themselves face physical violence.

The police find themselves caught between opposing factions, leaving little room for nuance. They must protect all groups from each other and safeguard the right to freedom of expression and movement. This requires constant assessment: when is intervention necessary, and when is

it better to wait? The escalations that have occurred—from confrontations between supporters and pro-Palestine sympathizers to violence by rioters in the city center—demonstrate how difficult this balance is.

What's striking is the speed with which strong words were used in the aftermath of the events. Politicians, administrators, and the media jumped to conclusions, without a clear understanding of what had actually happened. They spoke of failed action, negligence, or, conversely, of an incomprehensible tolerance. Such judgments, delivered before the facts are complete, influence public sentiment and directly affect the police officers who were on the streets. Many of them worked long shifts, sometimes exceeding fifteen hours, in a dynamic that defies a single narrative.

These events demonstrate the challenges of maintaining order in a society where local tensions are fueled by global conflicts. Digital appeals can mobilize groups with lightning speed, and expectations about police action vary. Balancing enforcement and freedom remains a difficult task, especially when reality unfolds faster than preconceived scenarios. This requires a sharp assessment of the facts, a flexible approach in the moment, and careful reflection afterward—not only on police action but also on the speed with which judgments are made.

Appendix 1: Abbreviations

AC General Commander

ACBB Department of Coordination of Surveillance and Security AE Arrest

Unit

AIVD General Intelligence and Security Service APV General Local

Regulation

CCB Conflict and Crisis Management

CCC Command and Control Centre

CCV Center for Crime Prevention and Security CIV Central Information Point for
Football Hooliganism DKDB Royal and Diplomatic Security Service GMS Integrated
Control Room System

GVB Municipal Transport Company

HIN Head of Information

Inspectorate of Justice and Security Inspectorate

JC Arena Johan Cruijff Arena

Royal Netherlands Marechaussee (KMar)

LCC National Coordination Center

ME Mobile Unit

MIVD Military Intelligence and Security Service NCC National Crisis
Center

NCTV National Coordinator for Counterterrorism and Security Public Prosecution Service

OSINT Open Source Intelligence

SGBO Staff Special and Large-Scale Operations TDA District Approach
Team

TOOI Public Order Intelligence Team

Public Demonstrations Act

Appendix 2: Overview of main documents used

Regarding the police and the NCTV (among others):

- Scripts for police deployment at the football match, the Kristallnacht commemoration and demonstration;
- Reports/journals from all police units regarding the police deployment; • Information products used by the police on and after November 7th; • Evaluation documents from all relevant units regarding the entire police deployment; • Reports from the local triangle;
- Organizational chart of the police structure surrounding the police action of November 7; • Logging within the SGBO (information, actions and internal consultations);

- Overview (GMS printout) with reports received that are related to November 7 and 8;
- Incoming and outgoing message traffic to and from the triangle;
- Official reports of the events surrounding the demonstration; • Timeline of the events regarding the police deployment with further explanation;
- Logging within the NCTV. The NCTV's internet monitoring specialists use a special environment for internet research. This environment logs the search queries that are made;
- Operational letter.

Appendix 3: Large-Scale and Special Operations Staff (SGBO)

The Major and Special Operations Staff (SGBO) is a special coordination and command structure within the Dutch police force, deployed in large or complex situations requiring additional deployment and coordination. These situations can range from large-scale events and serious incidents to disasters and demonstrations requiring a coordinated, large-scale police response.

In such circumstances, what is known as a large-scale or special operation may be implemented. The decision to establish an SGBO is usually made by the unit chief or an official mandated by the unit leadership, such as the Head of Operations. Once the decision to establish an SGBO has been made, a General Officer Commanding (AC) is appointed to lead the operation.

The SGBO is structured according to the "button model," in which the AC determines which functional components are activated and which button heads are responsible for their specific processes. Each button head controls a specific process, such as law enforcement, mobility, investigation, or surveillance and security. In addition, there are two supporting button heads: the Head of Support (HON) and the Head of Information (HIN). These support the other processes by providing information and organizing the necessary capacity. Risk analyses are performed jointly

with input from the HIN, while the HON is responsible for the organizational aspects and processing capacity requests.

The SGBO operates under the policy responsibility of the Triangle of Power. Management falls under the local authority, such as the mayor or the (chief) public prosecutor, and the SGBO coordinates police deployment. Depending on the escalation level, the representative police chief is the (acting) chief of police or an (acting) district chief. Furthermore, the SGBO serves as a key source of information for consultations within the Triangle.

Appendix 4: Flash attacks: online-driven public disturbances in a digital context

Social media plays a key role in online-fueled public disorder; calls via smartphones can rapidly mobilize large groups. This report provides several examples. The events in the early morning of November 8, 2024, are an example of so-called flash attacks: sudden public disorder instigated through online channels. Local tensions have been exacerbated by online calls and images, leading to rapid group formation and violence on the streets. Such flash attacks pose a growing challenge to public order: municipalities are increasingly confronted with physical public disorder that begins online or is amplified online.¹¹⁵

This description broadly discusses the characteristics of flash attacks, why they are difficult to control, and how digital stimulation influences the dynamics and police response. It also addresses the need for improved information provision, collaboration, and equipment for police and municipalities. While this phenomenon of public order disruption is not entirely new, it is manifesting itself in a new digital form – and existing knowledge on this topic appears to be insufficiently penetrating the operational and tactical level of the response.

Characteristics and dynamics of flash attacks

Flash attacks are characterized by spontaneous and rapid manifestations of unrest, often without

a formal organizer and announced demonstration. They originate or are powerfully accelerated through social media platforms (such as Twitter/X, Telegram, or Facebook), thus lacking the traditional warning signals for authorities.¹¹⁶.

Some key features include:

- *Unexpected and rapid gathering* There's usually no prior notice or known organizer. This makes it difficult to take preventative measures or engage in dialogue with initiators.¹¹⁷.
- *Long reach and mobilization power* Online appeals can mobilize a large group of people in a short time. This means the impact on public order is potentially much greater than with small-scale, locally held appeals.
- *Short preparation time for authorities* The exact size and location of the outbreak remain unclear for a long time, requiring rapid and flexible action.
- *No fixed group or structure* It often involves loose group formation based on shared sentiment. This makes it difficult to influence or address leaders in a targeted manner.
- *Escalation due to online imaging* Social media amplifies emotions. Small incidents can quickly go viral, which can encourage more people to participate.¹¹⁸.
- *Speed and mobility on the street* Small groups move quickly (e.g., by scooter, fat bike, etc.). The police struggle to keep pace with this high level of mobility.
- *Difficult to predict threat* Many online expressions are not punishable, but they can still cause unrest. Police often have to rely on fragmented information.

¹¹⁵ Center for Crime Prevention and Safety (CCV). (2024). Online-Incited Public Disturbances. See <https://hetccv.nl/themas/cyberveiligheid/online-aangejaagde-ordeverstoringen/>¹¹⁶ Center for Crime Prevention and Safety (CCV). (2024). Online-Incited Public Disturbances. See <https://hetccv.nl/themas/cyberveiligheid/online-aangejaagde-ordeverstoringen/>¹¹⁷ The same.¹¹⁸ See the findings report. Chapter 2. 'Chronological overview of the main events'.

Management tasks and digital stimulation

Digital stimulation is fundamentally changing the dynamics of public order problems. Some aspects addressed in this report include:

- *Mainly reactive action* Despite monitoring, the police in Amsterdam could not always anticipate; escalation happened faster than they could keep up with.
- *Insufficient effect of traditional means* Conventional means are insufficient for flash attacks. Flexibility and improvisation are essential.
- *Rapidly escalating violence dynamics* Online incitement accelerates escalation. In Amsterdam, random citizens were targeted with violence, fueled by digital calls.
- *Risk to emergency services and citizens* The unpredictability also puts bystanders at risk. Police must simultaneously protect and de-escalate.

Need for better information, collaboration and equipment

According to Landman (2023) and the Centre for Crime Prevention and Safety (CCV), improvements are needed on three fronts:

- *Information position*: Improvement of OSINT capacity, real-time interpretation of digital signals and better cooperation between intelligence and implementation are necessary¹¹⁹.
- *Cooperation* Municipalities, the police, the Public Prosecution Service, and national services such as the National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (NCTV) must work closely together. Role division and communication must be clear.
- *Equipment and tactics*: New forms of action, faster units, digital monitoring (such as drones) and legal instruments such as a digital area ban are required.¹²⁰

Well-known phenomenon in a digital jacket

Online-fueled flash attacks are a modern manifestation of an 'old' problem. Riots are not new, but their scale, speed, and anonymity have increased. Examples such as Project X (Haren, 2012) and the curfew riots (2021) demonstrate the influence of digital mobilization.¹²¹

A great deal of knowledge is now available, as demonstrated by Landman (2023), but it is only partially penetrating the operational level. Professionals are still searching for practical tools and protocols. Training, scenario thinking, and knowledge sharing can help bridge this gap.

¹¹⁹ Landman, W. (2023). Digitally Initiated Public Disturbances: An Analysis of Dynamics, Tactics, and Action Perspectives. Police & Science.

¹²⁰ Vuijk, G. & Bantema, W. (2021). The digital area ban as a tool against online-driven public disorder. Public Administration.

¹²¹ Center for Crime Prevention and Safety (CCV). (2024). Online-Instigated Public Disturbances. See <https://hetccv.nl/themas/cyberveiligheid/online-aangejaagde-ordeverstoringen/>

Justice and Security Inspectorate

Supervision, because justice and safety cannot be taken for granted.

This is a publication of:
Justice and Security Inspectorate
Ministry of Justice and Security
Hoge Nieuwstraat 8 | 2514 EL The Hague
PO Box 20301 | 2500 EH The Hague
Contact form | **www.inspectie-jenv.nl**

May 2025

No rights can be derived from this publication. Reproduction of information from this publication is permitted, provided this publication is cited as the source.